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Abstract This paper analyses the channels through which the economic and financial crisis of 2008–2009
was transmitted to Sub-Saharan Africa, with a focus on countries in situation of fragility. Trade stands
out as the main direct channel, even though intra-Africa remittances play a relevant role, given that most
migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa cannot afford the cost of migrating to Europe or to the United States and
stay close, remaining in the continent. Whether reduced aid flows also act as a crisis transmission channel
remains an open question, even though preliminary estimates suggest that, at least in the medium run, OECD
countries are likely to lower aid, with potentially very damaging effects. The paper also shows that many
African countries in a situation of fragility are characterised by very low resilience and capacity to cope
with shocks. It concludes, by highlighting how Sub-Saharan Africa (fragile countries’) policymakers’ room
for manoeuver is limited in periods of crisis because of low fiscal space and limited institutional capacity.
It advocates that the right response to the crisis would be to mobilise domestic resources, although this will
require functional institutions able to offset the potential trade-offs between adverse short-term shocks and
a long-term perspective.
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. Introduction1
hen the financial crisis broke out in the summer of 2007, there
as a widespread perception that Sub-Saharan Africa was going to
e affected only to a limited extent, with fragile countries making
o exception in this respect.2 The limited depth and low integra-
ion of their financial systems with the U.S. and European capital
arkets appeared to be sheltering them – so the reasoning went –
rom a direct transmission of the crisis. According to the African
evelopment Bank, “few banks and investment firms in Africa
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.ad derivatives backed by sub-prime mortgages. No difficulties
ave been reported on African sovereign wealth funds” (African
evelopment Bank, 2009a,b,c; web site). The Economist went even
urther suggesting that investors looking for alternative sources of
here parts of this paper were presented. None of the above is responsible
or mistakes or imperfections.
2 See, for instance, IDS (2008) on Ethiopia.
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meturns should “buy Africa”.3 As the events continued to unfold,
his perception changed; even though the wealth effects of the crisis
ere, indeed, less pronounced than in other developing countries,
ub-Saharan Africa, and especially fragile countries, proved to be
ulnerable to trade linkages, and to the disruption of the trade finance
ccompanying the financial crisis.4 Furthermore, contrary to the
tandard views of remittances being counter-cyclical, and according
o preliminary evidence, remittance flows contracted, unemployed
igrants started going back to their countries of origin, foreign direct
nvestment fell,5 and private sector financing was restricted. More-
ver, as the funds devoted to official development assistance tend
o follow donor countries’ economic cycle,6 a bad scenario could
aterialise with a fall in aid from OECD countries. Even if donor
ountries were to live up to their earlier commitments, keeping the
hare of aid over GDP constant could still lead to a reduction in
ctual flows, because of the recession and because of unfavourable
xchange rate movements.7 Two years on, the consensus view is
hat Sub Saharan countries have fared much better than expected,
ith an average rate of GDP growth around 2.5% in 2009 (OECD,
010) and an expected rate around 4.5% in 2010.
In what follows, after a brief overview of the crisis, we explore
he channels through which the current financial crisis was trans-
itted to SSA, emphasising the impact on fragile countries, and
ith an eye on the possible policy prescriptions. The crisis has,
ndeed, underscored Africa’s vulnerability to external shocks and
he low resilience of countries where the social protection mech-
nisms are not appropriate or not fully implemented. Countries in
ituations of fragility, despite their limited integration into the world
conomy, have also proved the least able to cope with the crisis,
iven a low fiscal capacity and lack of formal (and often informal)
afety-nets. This entails that – unless they prove able to guaran-
ee jobs, food security, life-saving programmes (AIDS/health) –
ragile countries could be pushed back to much lower levels of
evelopment, rolling back their recent progress. Furthermore, a
ossible interruption in the investments for capacity for growth
both in terms of infrastructures and human capital/education) may
roduce even worse effects in the long run. As African coun-
ries have a limited formal and informal financial system (Allen
t al., 2008), and, thus, a limited ability to borrow and smooth
hocks (Naudé, 2009; Oduro, 2009), the real effects of the crisis
on firms and individuals) can be not only disruptive but also very
ersistent.
. An overview of a crisis that originated elsewhere
inancial crises have been pervasive for many years. Bordo et al.
2001) find that their frequency in recent decades has been double
hat of the Bretton Woods Period (1945–1971) and the Gold Stan-
ard Era (1880–1993), comparable only to the period during the
reat Depression. Nevertheless, the financial crisis that started in
he summer of 2007 came as a great surprise to most people. What
nitially was seen as difficulties in the U.S. sub-prime mortgage
3 The Economist, 19 February 2008.
4 See Berman and Martin (2009).
5 See UNCTAD (2009a,c).
6 See Bertoli et al. (2007).
7 For instance, the UK pound has been devaluating versus the dollar and
he euro in the last year, so that, despite an increase in the pound amount,
id to some countries such as Sierra Leone, which receives substantial UK
unding, fell.
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arket, rapidly spilled over, first to financial markets, and then to
he real economy. The crisis has changed the financial landscape
orldwide and its full costs are yet to be evaluated.
Despite its severity, the 2008–2009 crisis is similar to past crises
n many dimensions. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) document the
ffects of banking crises using an extensive data-set of high and
iddle-to-low income countries. They find that systemic banking
rises are typically preceded by credit booms and asset price-
ubbles, and result in substantial drops in housing prices (on average
5% spread over a period of 6 years), equity prices (55% over 3 ½
ears), output (9% over two years) and an increase of unemploy-
ent (7% over a period of 4 years) and central government debt
86% compared to its pre-crisis level). While Reinhart and Rogoff
2009) stress that the major episodes are sufficiently far apart that
olicy-makers and investors typically believe that “this time is dif-
erent”, they warn that the global nature of this crisis made it far
ore difficult for many countries to grow their way out.
The seeds of the crisis can be traced to the low interest-rate
olicies adopted by the Federal Reserve and other central banks
fter the collapse of the technology stock bubble. In addition, the
ppetite of Asian central banks for (debt) securities contributed to
ax credit. These factors helped fuel a dramatic increase in house
rices in the U.S. and several other countries such as Spain, Ireland
nd the U.K. In 2006, this bubble reached its peak in the U.S. and
ouse prices there and elsewhere started to fall.8
Although the financial system, and, in particular, banks, came
nder tremendous pressure during this period, the real economy was
ot much affected. All this changed in September 2008 when the
emise of Lehman Brothers forced markets to re-assess risk. While
he bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers induced substantial losses to
everal counter-parties, its more disruptive consequence was the
ignal it sent to the international markets. Re-assessing risks previ-
usly overlooked, investors withdrew from the markets and liquidity
ried up.
In the months that followed and in the first quarter of 2009,
conomic activity in the U.S. and many other countries declined sig-
ificantly. Unemployment rose dramatically as a result. The general
onsensus is that the crisis was the worst since the Great Depression.
What caused the crisis? From August 2007 until September
008, there was fairly wide agreement that poor incentives in the
.S. mortgage industry had caused the problem. According to this
xplanation what had happened was that the way the mortgage
ndustry worked had changed significantly over the years. Tradition-
lly, banks would raise funds, screen borrowers, and then lend out the
oney to those who had been approved. If the borrowers defaulted,
he banks would bear the losses. This system provided good incen-
ives for banks to assess the creditworthiness of borrowers carefully.
nder the new system, brokers and banks screened borrowers. The
ortgages were then securitised and sold off. The people originating
he mortgages and securitising them do not bear any losses that might
ccur and so incentives were eroded. Another important incentive
ssue concerned the ratings agencies. Their incentives were eroded
ecause the agencies began to receive a large proportion of their
ncome from undertaking ratings of the securitised products.As the crisis continued and then after the default of Lehman
rothers in September of 2008, the dramatic collapse in the global
eal economy made this view that sub-prime mortgages were to
lame less and less plausible. The economies in many countries
8 Mayer et al. (2009) and Nadauld and Sherlund (2008) provide excellent
ccounts of the developments in the housing market preceding the crisis.
wb
m
a
h
w
t
d
m
t
d
g
c
t
t
t
p
p
o
e
a
d
i
c
G
c
t
l
3
T
v
u
a
p
c
r
s
f
t
tributed to output volatility, discouraging investments in long-term
productive capacity.
As emphasised by the IMF (2009a), most Sub-Saharan African
countries have almost consecutively suffered fuel, food and finan-
9 In the summer of 2008, oil was trading at $147 dollars a barrel, then the
price went down to around $40 in a short space of time. If you are going
to buy a car, should you buy one that is going to be fuel efficient, but costs
significantly more, or should you buy something less efficient but cheaper
on the assumption that oil prices are going to be low in the long-run?
10 According to Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009), the fall in world tradeThe effects of the financial crisis on Sub-Saharan Africa
in Asia and in Europe were drastically affected, even though their
banks had very little exposure to U.S. securitisations and remained
strong. As this happened, it became much more difficult to believe
that what caused all of this was an incentive problem in the U.S.
mortgage industry.
The main problem was that there was a large and global bubble
in real estate in the U.S. as well as in Spain, Ireland and the U.K.
The bubble burst causing huge problems in the securitised mortgage
market and in the real economy.
It can be argued that one of the main causes for the bubble were
the policies of the Federal Reserve back in 2003, when interest rates
were as low as 1%. This was at a time when housing prices were still
growing quite strongly at a rate above 1%. Even if they had only
been growing at the rate of inflation, which was around 3%, the
Fed suddenly created an incentive to go out and borrow at 1% and
buy houses going up at 3%. In addition, there were various other
aspects that made it advantageous to buy. These included the tax
advantages of being able to deduct interest on mortgages compared
to no deductibility of rent payments, plus some other policies to
encourage poor people to buy houses. All these factors created a
huge demand for buying houses. This led to an increase in house
prices and the process then fed on itself. When house prices started
to go up by 5 or 10% a year, then it became worth borrowing even
after the Fed raised interest rates. However, the Fed low interest
rate policy was not the only factor. In some European countries,
there were also large property bubbles even though the ECB was
controlling interest rates and they did not go nearly as low. The sec-
ond important element was global imbalances. This problem started
with the Asian Crisis of 1997. Many Asian economies, which had
done very well, such as South Korea, fell into serious difficulties. In
the case of South Korea, it was because its firms and banks had bor-
rowed too much in foreign currency. They turned to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for help to see them through these difficult
times. However, in exchange for help the IMF required countries to
raise interest rates and cut government spending. This is the exact
opposite of what the U.S. and Europe have done when faced with
a very difficult crisis. What the Asian countries deduced from the
1997 crisis was that what they had to do was to make sure that they
would never again have to go to the IMF to obtain relief from a cri-
sis. Instead, they accumulated literally trillions of dollars of assets
in reserves.
For political reasons, it became difficult for the Chinese, in par-
ticular, to buy companies and what they ended up doing was to invest
mainly in debt instruments. They bought a large amount of Trea-
suries, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage-backed securities.
This wave of debt happened not only in the U.S., but also in Europe.
This huge supply of debt helped to drive down lending standards to
ensure that it was all taken up. The large amount of debt resulting
from global imbalances was the second major factor contributing to
the bubble.
Why did the collapse of the bubble create so many problems?
The whole global economy went into a downward trend. It can be
argued that what went wrong was that people had made the wrong
decisions for about a decade, based upon the assumption that asset
prices would keep on going up. In the U.S., the aggregate savings
rate fell to zero. What was the point of saving? If you owned a house,
its price was going to keep on going up. If you owned stocks, their
value was going to keep on going up. So people stopped saving
and many borrowed to finance consumption. The leverage ratios of
households, of firms, and of institutions, all went up. When there was
the big fall in asset values, people found they were over-leveraged
and they had saved too little. This meant that they stopped doing
w
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hat they were doing before and started saving to pay off debt and
uild up their assets.
Another example of price volatility is commodities.9 For firms
aking investments, to know what to do is a significant problem. In
ddition, to the uncertainty about commodity prices, exchange rates
ave also been volatile. In the summer of 2008, the pound sterling
as over $2. Then, it went down to $1.40. The Euro was at $1.60
hen. It went down to about $1.25 before rising back to about $1.40.
To summarise, it is very difficult for anybody trying to make
ecisions because they do not know where prices are going to be a
onth from now, let alone a year from now. This is what is chilling
he global economy. Consumers and firms are unwilling to make
ecisions because they do not know what prices are likely to be
oing forward. This is why the sales of consumer durables such as
ars and investment goods such as machine tools have stalled. Since
hese represent a large proportion of exports and imports, world
rade has collapsed.
The volatility in commodity prices and the collapse in world
rade are two aspects of the crisis that are likely to be particularly
roblematical for African countries. We turn next to consider their
osition at the start of the crisis and the likely effects of the crisis
n them. The 2008–09 crisis ended a prolonged period of world
conomic growth and globalisation, in which world trade grew twice
s fast as world GDP. And, more importantly, it undermined the
rivers of the recent globalisation phase: open markets, globally
ntegrated production chains and many more footloose international
ompanies.
The slowdown of world trade was much sharper than that of
DP,10 possibly due to the general synchronisation of cycles among
ountries or to the larger weight of intermediate goods in trade, in
urn, due to the fragmentation of production – which, after stimu-
ating rapid growth over the last 10 years, magnified the decline.
. How the crisis hit Sub-Saharan Africa
he economic and financial crisis came on top of a period of highly
olatile commodity prices and exchange rates, which increased
ncertainty and strengthened a vicious circle of falling trade flows
nd investments. Food and fuel price spikes through mid-2008
ut food-importing and oil-importing Sub-Saharan African fragile
ountries under severe stress, pushing down their foreign exchange
eserves and making it difficult for them to pay for imports and to
ustain growth. Conversely, oil-exporting countries have benefited
rom increased revenues and several have been able to strengthen
heir foreign reserve position. However, the boom and slump con-as even sharper than in the Great Depression, at around 11% in a single
ear. The estimated elasticity of world trade to world GDP is around 2 per
ent. This has supported globalisation and backfired in 2009. Economic
ecovery in emerging and developing countries however was already back
n the upswing by mid 2009.
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Table 1 Real GDP Growth over different time periods.
Country Name 1980–89 1990–99 2000–07 2008 2009 2010
Angola 1.6 −1.8 20.3 13.2 −0.6 7.4
Benin −0.2 1.1 4.6 5.0 3.0 3.5
Botswana 7.9 3.5 4.4 2.9 −4.0 3.4
Burkina Faso 1.1 2.1 3.6 5.2 3.0 4.4
Burundi 1 −3.1 3.6 4.3 3.3 3.6
Cameroon 0.9 −2.2 3.5 2.9 2.0 3.5
Cape Verde 2.6 2.8 7.8 5.9 3.9 5.1
Central African Republic −1.6 −1.3 3.7 2.8 2.0 3.4
Chad 2.5 −1 4.6 0.3 −0.8 2.1
Comoros 0.1 −0.6 0.5 0.6 1.4 1.9
Congo, Dem. Rep. of −1.2 −8.2 6.3 6.2 2.6 6.3
Congo, Rep. of 3.7 −2 −1.6 7.3 7.6 11.9
Côte d’Ivoire/The Ivory Coast −4.5 −0.4 1.6 2.3 3.6 3.9
Equatorial Guinea −1.4 17.5 21.4 11.3 0.5 1.5
Eritrea – 6.5 1.3 −9.8 3.6 1.4
Ethiopia −0.9 −0.5 11.5 11.6 9.9 9.7
Gabon −11 −0.2 5.6 2.3 −1.0 3.0
Gambia, The 0.3 −0.6 6.3 6.1 4.8 5.4
Ghana 3.7 −1.1 1.6 7.0 4.7 6.4
Guinea 0.3 1 1.8 4.9 0.6 4.3
Guinea-Bissau 0.3 −1 2.7 3.3 2.9 3.4
Kenya 0.5 −0.8 7 1.7 2.5 3.6
Lesotho 1.3 2.3 5.1 4.4 1.1 2.3
Liberia −6.2 −3.1 9.5 7.1 4.4 7.7
Madagascar −2.4 −1.3 6.2 7.1 −4.5 −0.4
Malawi −2.4 1.9 8.6 9.8 7.0 6.0
Mali −1.7 0.9 4.3 5.0 4.4 4.6
Mauritania −0.4 −0.2 1 3.7 −1.1 4.5
Mauritius 4.9 4.2 4.2 5.1 2.8 4.2
Mozambique −0.6 2.2 7 6.8 5.4 5.8
Namibia −2.4 1 4.1 3.3 −1.8 3.0
Niger −2.9 −1.6 3.3 9.5 −0.9 3.2
Nigeria −1.9 0.2 6.4 6.0 3.0 4.4
Rwanda −0.5 1.2 7.9 11.2 4.5 5.1
São Tomé and Príncipe – – 6 5.8 4.1 4.6
Senegal −0.6 0 4.7 2.5 1.5 3.4
Seychelles 1.2 3.3 7.3 −0.9 −6.8 3.9
Sierra Leone −1.2 −5.2 6.4 3.9 3.5 4.0
Somalia – – – – – –
South Africa −0.3 −0.8 5.1 3.7 −1.8 2.4
Sudan, The 0.5 1.8 10.2 7.0 4.9 5.4
Swaziland 4.9 0.4 3.5 2.4 0.2 2.2
Tanzania 0.6 0.2 7.1 7.5 5.5 5.7
Togo −0.9 −0.5 1.9 1.8 2.2 2.5
Uganda −0.5 3.4 8.6 9.2 7.0 7.4
Zambia −1.7 −2.2 6.3 5.7 6.1 5.8
Zimbabwe 1.4 0.5 −6.1 −14.1 3.7 6.0
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backs, especially through cuts in education and health expenditure,Source: World Bank, Africa Development Indicators 2008/09; IMF, World E
Africa (October 2009); African Economic Outlook (2010).
Note: countries belonging to the operational definition of fragile countries
ial (3F) shocks. The average rate of growth, low in the 1980s and
990s, the so-called “lost decades”, has increased since 2000 (see
able 1), inducing an improvement in Millennium Development
oals (MDGs) even in some fragile contries.11 Most recent esti-
ates put real Sub-Saharan Africa GDP growth for 2009 at around
.5%, down from an estimated 5.5% in October 2008. These figures
ould make 2009 the first year in a decade in which most frag-
le Sub-Saharan African countries recorded negative growth in real
11 See Global Monitoring Report, 2009, and Harttgen and Klasen (2009),
or an assessment of MDG progress by country.
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0mic Outlook (April 2009); IMF, Regional Economic Outlook Sub-Saharan
n bold.
DP per capita, threatening the progress towards the MDGs and
ndermining political stability.12 Slower growth does not always
hreaten to reverse human development, but it does produce set-hich have serious long-term consequences (Table 2).
During the recent period of growth prior to the present crises,
ub-Saharan Africa had become more integrated with the rest of
12 Sub-Saharan Africa has, on average, a negative rate of growth of real GDP
er capita (−0.6%). Fragile Sub-Saharan African countries record a positive
.2% rate of growth, but this figure masks a high degree of heterogeneity.
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Sub-Saharan African fragile countries Sub-Saharan African nonfragile countries
Figure 1 Exports rising
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2009.
Table 2 List of Sub-Saharan African food importer and exporter
countries.
Food importersa
Angola Liberia
Benin Malawi
Burundi Mali
Cape Verde Mauritania
Central African Rep. Mauritius
Chad Mozambique
Comoros Niger
Congo, Dem. Rep. of Nigeria
Congo, Rep. of Rwanda
Equatorial Guinea São Tomé and Príncipe
Eritrea Senegal
Ethiopia Seychelles
Gabon Sierra Leone
Gambia, the Tanzania
Ghana Togo
Guinea Uganda
Guinea-Bissau Zimbabwe
Lesotho
Food exporters
Botswana Namibia
Burkina Faso Somalia
Cameroon South Africa
Côte d’Ivoire/The Ivory Coast Sudan, The
Kenya Swaziland
Madagascar Zambia
Source: ERD elaboration on Ng and Aksoy (2008).
Notes: countries belonging to the operational definition of fragile coun-
tries are in bold.
a Food is defined as raw food in SITC Rev. 2, excluding all cash crops,
processed food and seafood; a country is considered a food importer if
the difference between exports and imports is negative on the 2004/05
average.
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orld, as reflected in its rising (albeit still low) share in global
xports and in GDP (Fig. 1).13 Fragile countries, on average less
ntegrated than other Sub-Saharan African countries, followed the
ame trend. This increasing international integration has exposed
ub-Saharan African countries much more to disruptions in trade
nd to other shocks. It has also had a marked effect on tax revenues
and, in some countries, on tax policy), with reduced receipts from
rade taxes. These challenges of globalisation for resource mobilisa-
ion are exacerbated by the recent financial crisis, which also lowers
he tax base.
Fragile countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are characterised by
ery different resource endowments, but because of the high volatil-
ty of raw material prices (see Fig. 2), the negative spill-over of the
risis was felt both on oil exporters and producers of non-energy
ommodities (minerals and agricultural products) and the reversal
n price trends implies a toll on countries which are highly dependent
n natural resources.14
Table 3 assesses the vulnerability of different countries to differ-
nt type of shocks, demand for food and raw material importers and
upply for food and raw material exporters. Most fragile countries
tand out as highly vulnerable to either a supply or a demand shock.
. Channels of transmission of the financial and economic
risis: is there a fragile countries specificity?he literature on the transmission of the crisis distinguishes between
irect effects, i.e., the financial channels and indirect effects (real
hannels). As far as Sub-Saharan Africa is concerned, we main-
ain that, given the low level of formal financial development, the
13 The ratio of exports to GDP for some countries, particularly for the oil
xporters in Central Africa, is probably inflated by the high prices for raw
aterials.
14 For example, exporters of copper, oil, timber and diamonds; the fall in
opper prices, according to the African Development Bank, resulted in a
rop in Zambia’s foreign exchange reserves from USD 649 million during
he first half of 2008 to USD 454.5 million in the second part of the year.
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iFigure 2 Recent developmen
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ndirect real channels have prevailed. These include effects through
rade (both reduction in export earnings and terms of trade effect),
emittances, foreign direct investment and foreign aid. We briefly
etail these first, and look at the (lower) direct transmission of the
risis later.
.1. Trade
any Sub-Saharan African countries, including fragile raw material
xporters, have relied heavily on export markets to grow. The finan-
ial crisis has been transmitted to them mainly through declining
emand for exports and declining export prices.
It takes time to assess the effects of the crisis on trade flows, even
hough early signals were not reassuring: the demand from Europe,
he United States and China for Sub-Saharan African products and
ven more for the products of fragile countries has fallen sharply up
o mid 2009,15 more than for products from other developing areas
Fig. 3a–c). This is partly due to the fact that their exports are mainly
aw materials. But even for manufacturers who concentrate on low-
echnology products, this group suffers more than other developing
reas.16 Moreover, many Sub-Saharan African fragile countries have
uffered from increased exchange-rate volatility, which has induced
igh uncertainty and high costs for international trade. The countries
n the CFA17 zone have an exchange rate pegged to the Euro and
ave experienced a real exchange rate depreciation. This, to a certain
xtent, makes imports from these countries cheaper, but because
ragile states have little capacity to increase exports, they cannot
ully exploit this opportunity.18
15 After May 2009, the rebound of economic activity in China has had a
ositive effect on world trade as well as demand for African products.
16 See UNCTAD (2009a,b).
17 CFA stands for Communauté Financière Africaine or African Financial
ommunity. West African CFA countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte
’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Sénégal and Togo. Central African
FA countires are Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of
he Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.
18 African Development Bank (2009b).
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crices of food, metals and fuels.
Trade developments affect different countries differently,
epending not only on how much the country had relied upon trade
n order to grow, but also on their specialisation, main export and
mport markets, dependence on forms of financing, degree of inter-
ationalisation of domestic firms,19 place in the global value chain,
nd so on.
For primarily exporting countries, the financial crisis is likely to
ave affected the capacity to finance world trade (see IDS, 2009a,b;
erman and Martin, 2009; Humphrey, 2009; Gregory et al., 2010).
nternational trade depends heavily on trade credit being extended;
round 90% of trade is traditionally financed by short-term credit.
ith the credit crunch starting to bite, trade finance has also been
educed, concurring with an estimated fall in world trade around
0–15% (Auboin, 2009), as banks have limited their risk exposure.
s a consequence, there is a dual pressure on fragile countries: few
arnings, no credit.
The international trade literature has recently provided evidence
n the positive role of financial development on exports at a macro-
conomic level (see, for all, Manova, 2008 and Beck, 2002). This
ositive effect may partly come from the existence of fixed costs that
ave to be paid by firms to enter foreign markets, and which make
nancial constraints more stringent. This suggests a hypothesis of
hy African countries could be affected in a different way: exporters
ay finance themselves differently from exporters in other develop-
ng countries (and in developed countries). Mainly, due to the fact
hat the financial system is under-developed and highly risky and to
he fact that firms do not have sufficient self-finance, exporting firms
ely on letters of credit provided by credit institutions in destination
ountries. However, letters of credit require confidence – which is
ow in recessions – as well as availability of liquidity to provide
nance and insurance for payment to the exporters (again low, given
he credit crunch in developed countries). The limited availability of
omprehensive and reliable data on trade financing makes it difficult
o assess this impact; furthermore, the availability of, and the facility
19 A large amount of the recent literature has pointed out that globalisation
as fuelled by the “second unbundling” (Baldwin, 2006). If this process
ow rebundles itself, the effect on trade integration (or rather disintegration)
ould be more than a proportional fall.
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Table 3 Vulnerability to food, fuel and financial shocks in fragile countries.
Country Name Vulnerability to food shock Vulnerability to fuel shock
Demand Supply Demand Supply
Angola – – – High
Benin High High High Low
Botswana Medium Low Low Low
Burkina Faso Medium Medium High Low
Burundi Low High Low Low
Cameroon Medium Medium High High
Cape Verde High High Medium –
Central African Republic Medium Low Medium Low
Chad – – – –
Comoros Medium High Low –
Congo, Dem. Rep. of. – – – –
Congo, Rep. of – – – –
Côte d’Ivoire/Ivory Coast, The Medium High High High
Equatorial Guinea – – – –
Eritrea High High Low Low
Ethiopia Medium High Medium Low
Gabon Medium Low Low High
Gambia, The High High Medium Low
Ghana Medium High Medium Low
Guinea High Low High Low
Guinea-Bissau – – – –
Kenya Medium High High Low
Lesotho High Low Low Low
Liberia – – – –
Madagascar Medium High Medium Low
Malawi Medium High Medium Low
Mali Medium Medium High Low
Mauritania High High High –
Mauritius Medium High Medium Low
Mozambique Medium Medium Medium Medium
Namibia Medium High Low Low
Niger High High Medium Low
Nigeria Medium Low Medium High
Rwanda Medium High Medium Medium
São Tomé and Príncipe High High High Low
Senegal High High High Low
Seychelles High High High –
Sierra Leone High High High –
Somalia – – – –
South Africa Low Low Medium Low
Sudan Medium Low Low High
Swaziland Medium Medium Medium Low
Tanzania Medium High High Low
Togo Medium High High Low
Uganda Medium High High Low
Low
High
WorlZambia Low
Zimbabwe Low
Source: Institute of Foreign Studies, UK and authors’ calculation on IMF,
of, access credit is likely to vary substantially between sectors and
countries (cf. International Chamber of Commerce, 2010).Interestingly enough, Humphrey (2009),20 in a detailed study on
the horticulture sector in Africa, suggests that finance, so far, has
not been an issue for exporters:
20 Quotation from http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-sectors/initiatives-
partnerships/trade-finance-initiative/global-trade-liquidity-program/the-
project-market/. The argument in Humphrey (2009), is based upon an
original survey on two specific sectors and may be difficult to generalise.
l
oLow Medium
Medium Low
d Bank, UNCTAD.
“very few firms faced any problems with respect to availability
of trade finance. [. . .] Sub Saharan countries appear to be less
affected, so far, by trade finance problems than other regions [. . .]
restrictions on credit are hitting small traders and cooperatives
that do not have the business linkages needed to access. To the
extent that there is some credit rationing, the marginal firms are
hit first” (p. 2).Berman and Martin (2009), on the other hand, maintain that
ow financing opportunities have dampened African exports. They
bject to the finding by Humphrey (2009), and emphasise that:
8 F. Allen, G. Giovannetti
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Figure 3 (a) U.S. imports; (b) EU27 imports and (c) Chinese imports.
Source: Global Trade Atlas.
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AThe effects of the financial crisis on Sub-Saharan Africa
“during a financial crisis when uncertainty is high, trust and liq-
uidity are low, banks and firms in the importer country first cut
exposure and credit to countries which are seen as more at risk.
This would in particular affect trade financing through letters of
credit where the importer pays the exporting firm in advance.”
Their view is in line with the Global Monitoring Report 2009:
“with up to 20% of the $15.8 trillion world merchandise trade in
2008 involving secured documentary transactions, such as letter
of credit (LCs), trade finance is critical to sustaining the Multi-
lateral trading system. As the financial crisis spread, the demand
for LCs, insurance, and guarantees increased, because exporters
wanted to be certain that importers would pay on schedule” (p.
143).
One related issue is the cost of trade finance: the high volatil-
ity and the need for serious risk assessments are likely to result
in higher cost of finance for importers, exporters and financial
intermediaries.21 Furthermore exporters may find themselves in a
situation of not being able to repay their debts, and this could induce
a vicious circle. Moreover, Berman and Martin (2009) claim that,
in the past, SSA countries were hit harder and longer – than other
groups of countries – by recessions and financial crises in the coun-
tries to which they were exporting. They test the hypothesis that
this was just a composition effect, under the assumption that the
raw material cycle is closely connected to the cycle in industrial
countries, but they reject it: both the manufacturing and the raw
material exports of SSA have been hit harder than those of other
regions. They also find that African countries are hit harder when the
importer country is an industrialised country.22 This raises the issue
of the competitiveness of SSA exports, which is closely related to
the poor infrastructure conditions in most SSA countries. The poorly
maintained roads (often unpaved), the few ports, the limited railway
networks, the high shipping costs and especially the excessive check
points, red tape and inefficient border procedures, all increase pro-
duction costs, economic distance and uncertainty (for both domestic
and foreign firms), thereby undermining competitiveness.23
4.2. Terms of trade
After having historically worsened, over the last decade, the terms
of trade of developing countries had started to improve substan-
tially (Kaplinsky, 2006). The historically long commodity-price
boom (2002–2008), heaven for raw material exporters and hell for
importers, came to a halt in the second half of 2008 and future devel-
opments are uncertain.24 African countries which are net importers
of natural resources and – more recently – food, had been severely
affected by high prices, and their balance of payments have been
under severe stress. The decline in the world price of food items and
21 According to Global Monitoring Report, 2009, “by the end of 2008, trade
finance deals were offered at 300–400 basis points over interbank refinance
rates-two or three times more than the rate a year earlier [. . .]. The cost of LCs
was reported to have doubled or tripled for buyers in emerging countries”
(p. 144).
22 This result could mean that the current crisis would have a very large
impact on SSA, since it originated in the US and spread rapidly to developed
countries.
23 See UNCTAD (2009a,b,c).
24 While global demand has a negative impact because of the economic
crisis, that of China is picking up and could reverse the declining trend.
Furthermore, there are several supply constraints.
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il between June 2008 and March 200925 represented a significant
ndirect channel through which the financial crisis could give some
elief to fragile countries, mitigating the pressure of the adverse
erms of the trade shock, reducing inflation and improving their
alance of Payments. The level of stress of these countries at the
tart of the crisis, however, makes the recovery of fragile countries
ifficult.
The fall in prices has, on the other hand, had a serious negative
mpact on many fragile countries, given the high level of concen-
ration of their exports: exports of mining and related activities
epresent over 80% of the total for Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana,
xports of oil over 90% for Angola and Chad. Key consequences
f the decrease in raw material prices for resource rich countries
re: declining reserves, non-profitability of some oil fields that have
igh extraction costs, reduction in government funding capacity,
nd the cancellation or postponement of a number of investments in
xtractive industries which are highly dependent on foreign direct
nvestment.26 In addition, agricultural exporters tend to rely on one
or two) products, the typical case being Guinea Bissau, where
1.3% of exports is in cashew nuts, which is, therefore, strongly
ffected by (large) price changes.
The transmission of the crisis through terms of trade depends
n the degree of the concentration of exports. As Table 4 indi-
ates, many African countries in situations of fragility depend on
he export of few commodities for over three quarters of their export
evenue. However, to assess the likely impact of the crisis, the cru-
ial element is the elasticity of the commodity demand in importing
ountries (see Meyn and Kennan, 2009). Demand for fuel is typi-
ally quite rigid, so is the demand for agricultural products, while
he elasticity of demand for manufacturing tends to be higher. Fur-
hermore, the elasticity crucially depends on the characteristics of
he destination markets.27 What can be seen is that the export diver-
ification index for Sub-Saharan African fragile countries is less
han half that of non-fragile countries. The concentration of des-
ination markets is also high: 15 Sub-Saharan African countries
arn more than half of their export revenues from exports to a sin-
le geographical area. Specifically, nine countries derive more than
0% of their revenues from exports to Europe. For three countries,
jibouti, Togo and Zimbabwe, intra-Africa trade is predominant,
ccounting for over 50% of total trade. The products that fragile
ountries export outside Africa – mainly fuels28 – differ from what
hey export within the region, which also include manufacturing
roducts. Hence, their exports within Africa are more diversified
han their exports to the rest of the world. So, an expansion of intra-
frican trade could reduce the impact of commodity price volatility,
nd thus the vulnerability of fragile countries to trade-related shocks.
The relationship between state fragility and export concen-rations can be traced back to the resource endowments: their
bundance can reshape the interests and behaviour of an incum-
ent government, inducing excessive reliance on natural resources,
imiting the expansion of the manufacturing sector and deteriorat-
25 The FAO Food Price Index was down to 148 in December, from 219 in
une 2008, while the oil basket price of the OPEC was down from $131.2
o $38.6 over the same period.
26 A further effect, which could reinforce the previously indicated effects,
ould be currency depreciation.
27 See ODI country studies, 2009, reported on the ODI web page (financial
risis programme).
28 Because oil is mainly exported outside the region, intra-African trade for
ragile oil exporters is, on average, lower than for non-oil exporters.
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Table 4 SSA – Import and export concentration and three main exports with their share in total exports.
Country Name Export
concentration
2006
Import
concentration
2006
1st exported producta with its
share in total exportsb
2nd exported producta with its
share in total exportsb
3rd exported producta with its
share in total exportsb
Angola 1.0 0.1 Petroleum oils and oils obtained
from bituminous minerals,
crude (96.7%)
Benin 0.6 0.2 Cotton, not carded or combed
(29.8%)
Petroleum oils and oils obtained
from bituminous minerals, other
than crude (20.8%)
Copper waste and scrap (10.9%)
Botswana 0.7 0.1 Diamonds, whether or not worked,
but not mounted or set. Unworked
or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted
(56.0%)
Nickel mattes (21.2%) Copper mattes (3.7%)
Burkina Faso 0.6 0.2 Cotton, not carded or combed
(71.6%)
Sesamum seeds (4.3%) Guavas, mangoes and
mangosteens (2.6%)
Burundi 0.6 0.1 Coffee, not roasted: Not
decaffeinated (62.1%)
Black tea (fermented) & partly
fermented tea in packages
exceed 3 kg (4.3%)
Other black tea (fermented) and
other partly fermented tea
(3.4%)
Cameroon 0.5 0.3 Petroleum oils and oils obtained
from bituminous minerals,
crude (52.7%)
Wood sawn or chipped
lengthwise, sliced or peeled,
whether or not planed, sanded
or end-jointed, of a thickness
exceeding 6 mm (9.1%)
Cocoa beans, whole or broken,
raw or roasted (6.1%)
Cape Verde 0.5 0.1 Fish, frozen, excluding fish fillets
and other fish meat of heading
03.04 (25.4%)
Cotton, not carded or combed
(12.9%)
Cocoa paste, not defatted (10.2%)
Central African
Republic
0.5 0.2 Wood in the rough, whether or
not stripped of bark or sapwood,
or roughly squared (30.3%)
Diamonds, whether or not
worked, but not mounted or set.
Unsorted (21.4%)
Cotton, not carded or combed
(16.8%)
Chad 0.9 0.1 Petroleum oils and oils obtained
from bituminous minerals,
crude (95.3%)
Cotton, not carded or combed
(2.3%)
Comoros 0.5 0.1 Vessels and other floating
structures for breaking up
(31.0%)
Cloves (whole fruit, cloves and
stems) (19.8%)
Essential oils (terpeneless or
not), including concretes and
absolutes; resinoids; extracted
oleoresins (19.0%)
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 0.4 0.1 Petroleum oils and oils obtained
from bituminous minerals,
crude (83.2%)
Congo, Rep.of 0.9 0.1 Diamonds, whether or not
worked, but not mounted or set.
Unworked or simply sawn,
cleaved or bruted (24.6%)
Petroleum oils and oils obtained
from bituminous minerals,
crude (14.9%)
Cobalt ores and concentrates
(14.7%)
Côte d’Ivoire/Ivory
Coast, The
0.3 0.3 Cocoa beans, whole or broken,
raw or roasted (29.4%)
Petroleum oils and oils obtained
from bituminous minerals,
crude (17.0%)
Cocoa paste, not defatted (6.3%)
Equatorial Guinea 0.9 0.3 Petroleum oils and oils obtained
from bituminous minerals,
crude (87.9%)
Methanol (methyl alcohol)
(3.9%)
Liquefied: Natural gas (3.2%)
Eritrea 0.2 0.1 Natural uranium and its
compounds (69.1%)
Nuclear reactors, boilers, mchy
& mech appliance (6.4%)
Sesamum seeds (3.3%)
Ethiopia 0.4 0.2 Coffee, not roasted, not
decaffeinated (42.1%)
Sesamum seeds (16.3%) Fresh (6.5%)
Gabon 0.8 0.1 Petroleum oils and oils obtained
from bituminous minerals, crude
(71.8%)
Manganese ores and concentrates
(9.6%)
Wood in the rough, whether or not
stripped of bark or sapwood, or
roughly squared (0.0%)
Gambia, The 0.5 0.2 Cashew nuts: in shell (36.0%) Titanium ores and concentrates
(8.5%)
Ground-nut oil and its fractions,
crude (8.5%)
Ghana 0.4 0.1 Cocoa beans, whole or broken,
raw or roasted (45.6%)
Manganese ores and concentrates
(8.4%)
Petroleum oils and oils obtained
from bituminous minerals, other
than crude (4.1%)
Guinea 0.7 0.1 Aluminium ores and
concentrates (52.4%)
Aluminium oxide; other than
artificial (15.3%)
Copper ores and concentrates
(7.9%)
Guinea-Bissau 0.7 0.2 Cashew nuts: in shell (91.3%)
Kenya 0.2 0.2 Cut flowers and flower buds of a
kind suitable for bouquets or for
ornamental purposes, fresh
(13.7%)
Other black tea (fermented) and
other partly fermented tea
(11.8%)
Petroleum oils and oils obtained
from bituminous minerals, other
than crude (5.9%)
Lesotho 0.4 0.1 Diamonds, whether or not worked,
but not mounted or set. Unworked
or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted
(28.9%)
Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans,
waist-coats and similar articles,
knitted or crocheted, of cotton
(18.5%)
Men’s or boys’ suits, ensembles,
jackets, blazers, trousers, bib and
brace overalls, breeches and shorts
(other than swimwear), of cotton
(14.5%)
Liberia 0.7 0.8 Tankers (46.1%) Other vessels for the transport
of goods and/or persons (21.9%)
Natural rubber latex, whether or
not prevulcanised (11.6%)
Madagascar 0.2 0.2 Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans,
waist-coats and similar articles,
knitted or crocheted, of wool or
fine animal hair (12.4%)
Shrimps and prawns (10.1%) Women’s or girls’ suits,
ensembles, jackets, blazers,
dresses, skirts, divided skirts,
trousers, bib and brace overalls,
breeches and shorts (other than
swimwear) (8.0%)
Malawi 0.6 0.1 Tobacco, partly or wholly
stemmed (49.5%)
Raw sugar not containing added
flav (8.8%)
Other black tea (fermented) and
other partly fermented tea (5.7%)
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Table 4 (Continued)
Country Name Export
concentration
2006
Import
concentration
2006
1st exported producta with its share in
total exportsb
2nd exported producta with its share in
total exportsb
3rd exported producta with its
share in total exportsb
Mali 0.7 0.2 Cotton, not carded or combed (70.8%) Guavas, mangoes and mangosteens
(4.4%)
Sesamum seeds (2.0%)
Mauritania – 0.2 Iron ores and concentrates, including
roasted iron pyrites.
Non-agglomerated (45.3%)
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from
bituminous minerals, other than
crude (19.0%)
Molluscs or aquatic
invertebrates other than
crustaceans, other than live,
fresh or chilled (9.7%)
Mauritius 0.3 0.1 T-shirts, singlets and other vests, knitted
or crocheted; of cotton (17.5%)
Cane sugar and chemically pure
sucrose, in solid form (15.9%)
Prepared of Preserved Fish –
Tunas, skipjack and bonito (Sarda
spp.) (9.5%)
Mozambique 0.6 0.1 Aluminium, not alloyed (51.3%) Petroleum oils and oils obtained from
bituminous minerals, other than crude
(9.9%)
Electrical energy (5.1%)
Namibia 0.3 0.1 Diamonds, whether or not worked, but
not mounted or set: Unworked or
simply sawn, cleaved or bruted (20.2%)
Unwrought zinc, containing by weight
99.99% or more of zinc (18.7%)
Natural uranium and its
compounds; alloys, dispersions
(including cermets), ceramic
products and mixtures containing
natural uranium (12.1%)
Niger 0.5 0.1 Natural uranium and its compounds
(83.7%)
Paintings, drawings and pastels
(2.2%)
Nigeria 0.9 0.1 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from
bituminous minerals, crude (87.5%)
Liquefied: Natural gas (6.6%) Petroleum oils and oils obtained
from bituminous minerals, other
than crude (2.0%)
Rwanda 0.5 0.1 Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated
(43.2%)
Tin ores and concentrates (15.6%) Other black tea (fermented) and
other partly fermented tea
(13.7%)
São Tomé and
Principe
0.9 0.2 Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw
(49.5%)
Prefabricated buildings (4.6%) Parts and accessories (other
than covers, carrying cases and
the like) suitable for use solely or
principally with machines of
headings 84.69 to 84.72 (4.6%)
Senegal 0.2 0.2 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from
bituminous minerals, other than crude
(14.3%)
Phosphoric acid and polyphosphoric
acids (9.5%)
Ground-nut oil and its fractions,
crude (7.1%)
Seychelles, The 0.6 0.3 Tunas, skipjack and bonito (Sarda spp.)
(47.8%)
Yellowfin tunas (Thunnus albacares)
(11.0%)
Skipjack or stripbellied bonito
(7.9%)
Sierra Leone 0.5 0.1 Diamonds, whether or not worked,
but not mounted or set: Unworked or
simply sawn, cleaved or bruted
(31.1%)
Aluminium ores and concentrates
(11.7%)
Titanium ores and concentrates
(11.2%)
Somalia 0.4 0.3 Goats (33.7%) Live bovine animals: Other than
pure-bred breeding animals (10.5%)
Pure-bred breeding animals
(10.4%)
South Africa 0.2 0.1 Platinum: Unwrought or in powder
form (7.6%)
Diamonds, whether or not worked, but
not mounted or set: Unworked or
simply sawn, cleaved or bruted (6.1%)
Gold (including gold plated with
platinum) unwrought form (5.1%)
Sudan, The 0.9 0.1 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from
bituminous minerals, crude (92.3%)
Swaziland 0.4 0.1 Raw sugar not containing added flav
(12.7%)
Food preparations not elsewhere
specified or included (10.2%)
Mixtures of odoriferous
substances of a kind used in food
or drink (9.9%)
Tanzania 0.4 0.2 Tobacco, partly or wholly stemmed
(8.5%)
Coffee, not roasted: Not decaffe (7.5%) Fish fillets and other fish meat
(whether or not minced), fresh or
chilled (7.4%)
Togo 0.3 0.2 Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw
or roasted (25.3%)
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from
bituminous minerals, other than
crude (13.0%)
Cement clinkers (8.3%)
Uganda 0.3 0.2 Coffee, not roasted: Not decaffe
(25.6%)
Fish fillets and other fish meat
(whether or not minced), fresh or
chilled (12.8%)
Tobacco, partly or wholly
stemmed (7.3%)
Zambia 0.7 0.1 Refined copper: Cathodes and sections
of cathodes (62.1%)
Copper ores and concentrates (6.3%) Cobalt mattes and other
intermediate products of cobalt
(5.3%)
Zimbabwe 0.2 0.1 Nickel, not alloyed (22.7%) Tobacco, partly or wholly stemmed
(11.1%)
Nickel ores and concentrates
(9.4%)
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2008 (data of 2006: import and export concentration): (AfDB 2009d, data of 2007, three main products
s are
rts.
prodexported).
Notes: Countries belonging to the operational definition of fragile countrie
a Products are reported when accounting for more than 2% of total expo
b Figures in ( ) represent the share of Africa in the World export for eaching governance.29 Chauvet and Collier (2008) find that resource
rents significantly reduce the chances of achieving a sustained
turnaround out of a situation of state fragility. A doubling of resource
29 See Chapter 4, and Collier, 2009, for further analysis of these mecha-
nisms.
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ents as a share of GDP roughly doubles the time taken. Fur-
hermore, because of low export diversification, fragile states may
e more prone to the “Dutch disease”, which occurs when the
xchange rate appreciates as a result of capital inflows, making
xports less competitive. However, the resource endowments pro-
ide a means of reacting to the crisis (for instance, providing enough
eserves).
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Table 5 International tourism, receipts (% of total exports).
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Angola 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3
Benin 14.6 16.4 15.7 15.1 15.4 14.0 –
Botswana 7.6 8.9 11.5 12.5 13.0 10.6 10.2
Burkina Faso 9.7 9.6 – – – – –
Burundi 2.6 2.0 4.2 2.7 2.8 2.1 1.7
Cameroon 5.1 6.6 4.3 8.5 5.8 – –
Cape Verde 43.9 46.1 51.4 52.9 51.6 48.4 55.1
Central African Republic – – – – – – –
Chad – – – – – – –
Comoros – – – – – – –
Congo, Dem. Rep. – – – – – – –
Congo, Rep. 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.7
Côte d’Ivoire/Ivory Coast, The 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.9
Equatorial Guinea – – – – – – –
Eritrea 36.8 – – – – – –
Ethiopia 20.7 22.3 24.5 26.7 27.2 27.6 29.1
Gabon 2.8 1.7 2.9 2.5 1.8 – –
Gambia, The – – – 35.9 28.0 31.6 34.4
Ghana 14.6 15.6 14.9 13.8 14.5 22.2 17.8
Guinea 2.5 2.6 5.4 4.3 3.7 – –
Guinea–Bissau – 4.5 3.6 3.4 2.6 – –
Kenya 18.0 17.8 16.0 17.1 18.7 18.2 19.8
Lesotho 9.5 7.2 5.1 5.3 4.4 4.2 3.7
Liberia – – – – – – –
Madagascar 12.8 11.7 8.7 10.1 16.9 21.8 –
Malawi 6.9 8.5 9.5 – – – –
Mali 7.3 10.4 10.1 11.8 11.7 10.8 –
Mauritania – – – – – – –
Mauritius 27.9 28.8 28.1 30.2 33.5 31.7 32.5
Mayotte – – – – – – –
Mozambique 10.7 6.6 5.7 7.9 5.5 6.6 5.2
Namibia 10.4 18.3 18.7 22.8 18.5 14.6 14.9
Niger 7.2 9.1 6.1 6.6 6.1 7.8 –
Nigeria 0.9 0.9 1.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 –
Rwanda 21.1 18.2 23,4 21.5 21.9 19.1 11.2
São Tomé and Principe 61.5 90.4 67.7 69.7 – – –
Senegal 11.6 12.5 13.8 14.7 13.2 – –
Seychelles 46.7 43.3 44.9 41.8 40.8 37.4 37.8
Sierra Leone 18.2 17.3 38.7 33.9 26.9 24.5 7.4
Somalia – – – – – – –
South Africa 9.0 9.1 10.1 13.9 12.7 12.7 11.8
Sudan, The 0.3 0.2 5.2 0.7 0.5 1.8 2.1
Swaziland 1.9 2.0 3.8 0.4 3.7 3.5 3.3
Tanzania 29.5 35.4 33.6 30.2 29.2 28.4 29.6
Togo 2.6 3.3 3.1 3.8 3.3 3.2 –
Uganda 24.9 27.0 27.5 22.3 24.1 27.9 23.8
Zambia 15.2 7.6 6.1 7.1 4.4 3.9 2,7
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restaurants and so on) amplifying the impact of the shock.
Maritime transports, shipping and related services have also
suffered from the downturn in demand.30Zimbabwe – –
Source: WDI, 2008.
Note: countries belonging to the operational definition of fragile countries
.3. Tourism
ecently, in the years of high world growth and trade expansion,
ourism has become an important source of foreign currency earn-
ngs even in some fragile countries (see Table 5).
Since September 2008, the number of air passengers has dropped
harply. Although a good part of this drop is due to reduced travel
or business purposes, it would also include less tourist travel, as
ouseholds generally reduce consumption on luxury goods. As a
onsequence, Massa and te Velde (2008) also include African coun-
ries exporting high income elastic services such as tourism in the
m
M– – – – –
n bold.
ist of possible “losers” from the 2008–2009 crisis. Moreover, a fall
n tourism flows is likely to spread fast to other services (hotels,30 In Tanzania, the fleet deployment in February 2009 compared to
id-2008 was minus 8%; see UNCTAD (2009a,b,c), p. 23, and Global
onitoring Report, 2009.
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Table 6 Some example of investments postponed/cancelled in the
last few months.
Country Type of project Postponed Cancelled
Botswana Mining Project 
Congo Mining Project 
Sudan Refinery Project 
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oTanzania Mining Project 
Zambia Mining Project 
Source: authors’ elaborations.
4.4. Foreign direct investments
FDI has been an important source of resources for some (few) Sub-
Saharan African fragile countries and a powerful engine of growth,
depending on which sectors they were targeted at. Investments into
the oil industry generate little domestic employment, given the
small number of employees and high skills required, while those
for tourism or some traditional manufacturing stimulate domestic
employment, consumption and growth.31
FDI as a share of GDP has been lower in Sub-Saharan Africa than
in other developing countries, unevenly distributed across countries
and often related to natural resource endowment. FDI had been
increasing in absolute terms and as a share of GDP since 2000,
but the economic crisis has reduced the total amount of funds or
delayed some projects. OECD (2008) signals that FDI to non-fragile
African countries amounted to $24.5 billion in 2005, compared to
$6.4 billion to fragile countries in the same year. Though this figure is
higher than the $4.2 billion recorded in 2000, FDI to fragile African
countries has been declining since 2003, and highly concentrated:
four resource-rich countries, namely, Angola, Chad, Nigeria and the
Sudan, received 70% of the total FDI over the period 2000–2005
(OECD, 2008).
The crisis tightened credit and lowered profits for firms in
developed and emerging economies, leading them to revise their
investment plans downwards and assume a wait-and-see attitude.32
The high and increasing uncertainty linked to the concurrent fuel,
food and financial crises explains the general decline in FDI, which
has been particularly damaging because of its persistent effects,33
perhaps even beyond those warranted by a country’s fundamentals.
In the first half of 2008, Angola and Nigeria, as well as the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea, each received more
than $1 billion in FDI inflows.34 But in the second half of 2008 and
the first half of 2009, a number of investments in natural resources
and manufacturing were put on hold or cancelled. The Democratic
Republic of Congo and Zambia have had mining projects cancelled;
the Sudan has had a refinery postponed, as did mining projects in
31 See Bonassi et al. (2006).
32 Theoretical models of investment under uncertainty (Dixit, 1989) have
in the past used the option theory to explain this investors’ attitude when the
environment is perceived as risky. For the same values of the fundamentals,
the behaviour of firms is different, depending on the history of the firms:
if a firm is already investing in a country, it goes on, but new investments
are postponed. The behaviour of firms could explain the current situation:
what is a discontinuity in individual behaviour (firms may decide to invest or
not to invest in the same situation, depending on their history, and multiple
equilibria are possible) makes the aggregate investment function highly non-
linear.
33 It takes time for investments to be realised, and a decline in a year
produces a long-lasting impact over the years to come.
34 See UNCTAD (2009b), p. 42.
g
F
o
b
o
m
2
A
c
K
i
P
(13
otswana and Tanzania. However, Angola with over $ 15.000 and
igeria with over $ 20,000 were the top receivers in 2008 (AfDB
010b).
As countries become more open to capital flows, crises are
ore easily transmitted across borders (see Reinhart and Rogoff,
008) and the traditional positive long-term relationship between
nancial development and growth seems to co-exist with a nega-
ive short-term relationship through financial fragility. Against this
ackground, there is evidence that the 2008–2009 crisis has had a
egative impact on international investments, even though Africa
as so far been less affected than other regions (Tables 6 and 7).35
The actual high number of cancellation and postponements in
nvestment in Africa is, indeed, aggravated by the fact that fragile
ountries are perceived as “high risk”. Political risk, together with
ow returns on investment, macro-economic instability, low pro-
uctivity, exchange rate performance, wages and infrastructure are
mong the key variables that have been identified in some of the
mpirical works as the main deterrent of investments in African
ountries compared to other developing countries.36 Naudé and
rugell (2007) also add that the existence of good institutions
s equally important in attracting FDI. In a situation of uncer-
ainty, another relevant issue is that of contract enforcement. Recent
esearch has pointed to the importance of a sound legal framework
nd stable political environment to attract foreign capital, as well
s to the influence of a country’s history of default. It is, however,
ifficult to enforce a contract if the players are not well identified,
nd have little – or a bad – reputation. This, of course, means that
ome commitment devices have to be imposed, but this is very dif-
cult in countries with dysfunctional institutions, unless deals are
ade through the informal institutions, under the assumption that
hese are easily recognised by people and, at least to a certain extent,
ccountable. One related issue concerns the absence of capacity to
anage public resources, which can lead to substantial problems of
orruption. One solution is the implementation of a mechanism that
reates external controls on revenue generating entities.37
High uncertainty, reduced access to finance, grim growth
rospects and a higher degree of risk aversion are the main chan-
els of transmission of the crisis that dampen FDI flows. Some
ositive forces do, however, exist. According to UNCTAD (2009b)
financial crises and tough economic periods also offer opportuni-
ies to buy assets at ‘bargain prices’ and take advantage of large
cale consolidations in some industries” (p. 30), and a number
f firms have taken advantages of such opportunities in “oil and
as, metal mining, automotive and financial services industries”.
urthermore, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) – especially those
f oil rich Gulf states and East Asian emerging countries – have
een increasingly involved in FDI both in advanced and in devel-
ping countries (South–South FDI) and might play a role both in
anufacturing and in land acquisition in Sub-Saharan Africa.
35 UNCTAD (2009b) predicts that global FDI inflows declined by 15% in
008 to about $1.6 trillions and that further decline is expected for 2009.
fDB (2009c) says that FDI to Africa in 2008 were $61.9 billion (up to 17%
ompared to 2007) and emphasises the differences between countries.
36 See Asiedu and Esfahani (2001); Razafimahefa and Hamori (2005);
hadaroo and Seetanah (2007).
37 An example of a control mechanism implemented in Liberia has been, for
nstance, GEMAP, the Governance and Economic Management Assistance
rogramme, which is described by Dwan and Bailey (2006) and UNDP
2006).
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Table 7 Pros and cons of foreign direct investment in land.
Conditions for sustainable poverty-reducing
effects of large-scale land investments
Actions that can help to meet the conditions Observations
Clear definition and recognition of
pre-existing resource-use rights.
Land titling of resources; mapping of
community resources and informal use of
resources; involvement of local populations
in decision-making process.
Most of Africa’s people do not hold formal
use or property rights to the natural resources
which they access. Land titling requires time
and resource-costly processes. International
experiences show that the badly designed
land tenure reform and titling programmes
can exclude more vulnerable groups and can
create destabilising forces. Transparent and
informed engagement of local stakeholders is
particularly difficult in countries with a low
level of education and weak social contract
between citizens and state institutions.
The design of contracts able to represent a
sustainable balance between priority,
perspectives and incentives of the
stakeholders (investors, governments and
local populations).
The implementation of transparent and
participatory decision-making process.
Technical assistance to capacity building for
contract design, supervision, management.
See observations above.
One of the main obstacles to this condition is
the imbalance in bargaining power and
negotiating capacity between investors,
governments, and local communities and
farmers.
Credibility and enforceability of
commitments by investors and host
governments. Identification and
compensation of the rights of negatively
affected people.
Baseline assessment studies on ex-ante
environmental, social and economic
conditions.
Monitoring of contract accomplishment by
state institutions or international
stakeholders.
Actions to ensure transparency and
dissemination of information.
Local populations usually lack financial and
human resources to meet these conditions.
Recipient governments are likely to lack
necessary capacity and fiscal resources or
willingness to maintain effective structures
and impose credible threats of punishment
for non compliance. Problems of asymmetric
information can hinder the definition,
evaluation and monitoring of compliances.
Creation of better and more labour
opportunities.
See actions above on contract enforcement
and design.
Strengthening and involvement of trade
unions and labour/worker representatives.
Economic and financial sustainability of the
projects might provide new investors with
motivations to implicitly or explicitly retract
their commitments for implementation of
labour standards and labour-intensive
techniques. Trade unionisation of workers
might be against interests of the national
élite.
Agricultural projects should lead to an
increase in productivity by at the same
time being environmentally sustainable.
See actions above. Setting up and
strengthening of institutions (rules, agencies
and structures) for environmental regulation
and supervision. Technical assistance to new
investors and mechanisms to adopt local
knowledge of agricultural techniques.
See observations above.
In many of Africa’s areas, land has a low
resilience to agricultural intensification.
External investors might lack an appropriate
knowledge of the local ecosystems and
sustainable production practices.
Contract farming arrangements, joint
ventures, and systems of contract-growing
can improve the absorption of local between
investors and local populations. However
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inventories suggests that land investments in Africa have been
mushrooming. The scale and consequences of this trend are still
largely unknown since qualitative and quantitative information are
38.5. A peculiar direct investment: land acquisition
ne probably unexpected consequence of the financial crisis is an
ncreasing trend to buy farmland in developing countries (mainly in
SA) by other countries seeking food security (namely, China and
rab countries, see Cotula et al., 2009, and Von Braun and Meinzen-
ick, 2009). It is an alternative way to invest capital in a moment ofow and risky returns on financial assets. Higher agricultural prices
uch as those prevailing in 2008 may have pushed the trend, since
hey may result in higher land prices, because “the expected return
o land increases when profit per unit of land increases” (Von Braun
nd Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Furthermore, there is a problem of lack of
l
Fthese results are likely to be jeopardised by
asymmetric economic and power positions
of the counterparts.
ater in some countries (including China and the Emirates), which
akes foreign production attractive, because it allows countries not
o deplete their domestic water resources.
Information by the international press and some nationalimited, not fully reliable and not transparent. Data collected
38 More information is needed on the type of contract: lease, or property?
or how long? Guaranteed? How? Issues of security related to it. In SSA,
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Source: Unctad, World Investment Report 2009.
from media reports reveal that an estimated 15-20 million hectares
might have been subject to bargaining in developing countries (The
Economist 2009) and the phenomenon mainly involves the Sub-
Saharan region (see Fig. 4).
Several factors interact to explain foreign land acquisitions in
Africa, both from the demand and the supply side. On the demand
side, the perception of a great availability and accessibility of farm-
land and of under-exploited water sources in Africa has represented
a preliminary condition, but a triggering role has been played by the
recent trends in food and oil prices and the consequent protectionist
reactions of some major food exporters. These events have revealed
the ongoing transformation in food and energy markets which does
not exclude price spikes in the future. Increased demand of food
(such as meat and dairy produce) requiring land-demanding pro-
duction techniques, growing demand of energy sources which offer
an alternative to fossil fuels, increasing scarcity of water for pro-
ductive use and slow rate of growth in farm productivity, and, in
some areas, reduction in farm production, all tend to exert pres-
sures to farmland frontier expansion. The margin for higher rates
of return on agricultural commodity investment has increased, and
food importers might be less willing to entrust their food security
completely to international markets, which are out of their control.
Outsourcing food production has become a more feasible national
strategy in a period in which the link between FDI and foreign poli-
cies (or national interests) has been reinforced by the increasing
involvement of state-owned enterprises and of Sovereign Wealth
Funds (SWFs) in international markets.
On the other hand, the neglected role of the agricultural sector
long suffered by many African countries has stimulated the supply
of land to the market. The countries towards which land investments
are directed are now attempting to take the opportunity represented
by the rising trend of land and water value. The underlying idea is
to promote the economic development of the country and to reduce
poverty by exchanging abundant resources (land) with scarce ones
(capital, infrastructures, skills, technology).
de jure the state owns most rural land, but ownership is de facto different.
This has consequences on the type of contracts being signed and therefore
on the costs and benefits for the contractors.
m
i
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finvestments in land.
If this wave of land acquisitions continues to expand accord-
ng to the current pattern, the consequences at stake for African
griculture and African populations could be profound, persistent
nd not easily reversible. The direction of this process is heading
owards land concentration, the development of agricultural pro-
uction and distribution systems, and labour relations oriented to
he agri-business model, greater integration with urban and interna-
ional markets, and restrictions of no formally recognised-resource
ses. A further potential problem is that there are no incentives for
ountries acquiring land, especially if they obtain the lease and not
he property,39 to pursue a sustainable use of resources.
In many African countries, and especially in fragile ones, the
ajority of the population live in rural areas and agriculture devel-
pment can have a leading role in poverty reduction and economic
rowth, while investment in infrastructural development, know-how
nd technology can have significant positive spill-overs. Thus, the
ocial and economic transformation that could emerge from this
rocess could open great opportunities for poverty reduction and
he economic development of African recipient countries. However,
he risks are substantial, the main risk being a possible loss of long-
erm control over land for countries or local communities. Recipient
ountries may become more food insecure, suffer from displacement
f workers, and have a higher probability of riots and even con-
icts. Changes in access to land and water resources, in resource
anagement and in production techniques, can have implications
lso for environmental sustainability. International development
gencies and the research community are working to provide recom-
endations and assistance to stakeholders (investors, governments,
ocal populations and civil society) in order to facilitate materiali-
ation of the potential benefits of the renewal interest in agricultural
nvestment, but these efforts are likely to be costly and with highly
ncertain results.
As shown in the following table, the conditions that should be
et to ensure the poverty-reducing effects of domestic and foreign
nvestment in Africa’s farmland are very challenging, especially in
ountries with weak negotiating capacity or position with incoming
nvestors, with low capacity to reconcile conflicts over resources, or
39 Indeed, even with property, if property rights are not ensured, as in most
ragile countries.
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ously endanger the ability of the recipient countries to cope with the
effects of the crisis through adequate fiscal policies, and it would thus6
here citizen claims are less likely to receive the attention of state
nstitutions, in other words, in fragile states.
.6. Remittances
igrants’ remittances to Africa reach countries where other private
ows, such as foreign direct investments, are limited or non-
xistent, sometimes even exceeding the size of official development
ssistance (OECD, 2008). The social and economic relevance of
igrants’ remittances for fragile African countries can be hardly
ver-stated,40 as the usual concerns about the ability of Balance of
ayments statistics to capture these transfers apply a fortiori in this
ontext. This is so because “Sub-Saharan African migrants have
ended to stay on the continent”, as Sander and Maimbo (2005)
bserve, and formal remittance corridors among African countries
end to be characterised by extremely high transaction costs.41 This
s a factor that drives transfers towards informal channels (Freund
nd Spatafora, 2008), which are hardly captured by official figures.
This argument applies to an even larger extent to fragile coun-
ries, as they are, on average, poorer than non-fragile ones, and the
ow level of incomes makes it harder for their would-be economic
igrants – not to mention the refugees – to afford the high migration
osts that are associated with migration to a high-income country.
ig. 5 reports the share of emigrants from each country, which reside
n another African country.42
The share is as high as 89% for Niger and 83% for the Central
frican Republic, and many other countries are characterised by a
ainly intra-regional pattern of migration. Fig. 5 has two relevant
mplications: first, Balance of Payments figures on remittances are
ost likely to underestimate severely the actual flows of migrants’
emittances to fragile countries; second, the impact of the current cri-
is on fragile countries depends also on how some emerging African
ountries, such as South Africa, will be affected, as they represent
mportant destination countries for African migrants.
The relevance of remittances for recipient countries is not con-
ected exclusively to their sheer size, but it also relates to a key
istinctive feature of this flow, namely, the fact that remittances tend
o be stable – or even move counter-cyclically (Ratha, 2006) – along
he business cycle of recipient countries, thus reducing the likeli-
ood of a Balance of Payments crisis (Bugamelli and Paternò, 2006).
owever, a crucial question is how remittances to fragile African
ountries will react to the large downward fluctuation that has char-
cterised the business cycle of most recipient countries throughout
009.
An early assessment provided by Ratha et al. (2008a,b) sug-
ested that remittances were likely to remain resilient even in the
ace of the global financial and economic crisis, albeit with a reduc-
ion in the strong rate of growth observed over the past few years.
recent contribution by Ratha and Mohapatra (2009) moderated
his initial optimism, suggesting that remittances to developing
40 See Maimbo (2006) for a description of how remittances contribute to
he survival of key economic activities in Somalia, where remittances are
stimated to represent 40 per cent of the incomes of urban households.
41 For instance, a $200 transfer from South Africa to Mozambique had a
ost that ranged between $15.00 and $35.62 in the first quarter of 2010 (see
ttp://remittanceprices.worldbank.org).
42 Note that, for some countries, such as Ghana and Egypt, a break-down of
he estimated number of immigrants by countries of origin is not available,
o that the data reported in Fig. 1 are an under-estimate of the extent of
ntra-regional migration in Africa.
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ountries will fall between 5% and 8% in 2009, with a similar
all predicted for Sub-Saharan Africa alone, where remittances are
stimated to $18–19 billion, down from the $20 billion that were
fficially recorded in 2008. Ratha and Mohapatra (2009) argue that,
his reduction notwithstanding, migrants’ remittances is the flow to
eveloping countries which will be less sensitive to the negative
ffects of the crisis.43
A recently released economic outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa
resents less optimistic figures with regard to the reaction of remit-
ances to the recession which is hitting the countries of destination
f the migrants, as the IMF (2009a,b) suggests that the economet-
ic analysis of the data reveals that “a 1 percentage point decline in
rowth in host countries would lead to a 4% decline in remittances”.
he IMF (2009a,b) argues that this figure could actually represent
n upper bound for the actual decline in remittances due to the crisis,
s the widespread nature of the 2008–2009 crisis is unprecedented
n the historical data.44
A more detailed, country-specific assessment is unfeasible as
t would require us to have reasonable forecasts about the evolu-
ion of the bilateral exchange rates of the destination countries of
he migrants against the dollar, as this is the single most relevant
actor in shaping the dollar value of the incoming migrants’ remit-
ances. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the remittances are unlikely
o represent the single most relevant channels through which frag-
le African countries have been affected by the crisis, although the
eduction in migrants’ remittances has probably been larger than
hat which early forecasts suggested.
Furthermore, the decline in remittances has an impact on the
omposition of expenditure, if, as suggested, for instance, by
aimbo and Ratha (2005), remittances are more likely to be invested
n education and housing than income from domestic sources is. A
ower expenditure in schooling could, however, have very persistent
ffects, and it could also affect the prospects for future recovery.
.7. Fading aid: a scenario to be avoided
he OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recently
elebrated 2008 as a record year for aid, as the total resources
llocated by its member countries to development aid reached an
nprecedented level.45 Chinese flows also increased to a new peak
n 2008. However, such an achievement could be short-lived, since
rises tend to induce donor countries to reduce the fiscal resources
llocated to official development assistance. A failure on the part
f donor countries to live up to these commitments would seri-eopardise the progress towards the achievement of the Millennium
evelopment Goals.
43 The possible reduction in the tightening of immigration controls in
estination countries would produce only a delayed and limited impact
n remittance flows, whose size is determined by the existing number of
igrants and not by the size of recent arrivals, and the fiscal stimulus pack-
ges that are currently being deployed contain substantial provisions for
nfrastructural investments, which are realised by migrant-intensive firms
Ratha and Mohapatra, 2009).
44 A recent study by Cali and Dell’Erba (2009), estimating remittances for
SA in 2009 and 2010, suggests a reduction of 6% and 7%, respectively.
45 OECD DAC, “Development aid at its highest level ever in
008”, document released on 30 March 2009, and available at:
ttp://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3343,en 2649 34487 42458595 1 1
1,00.html.
The effects of the financial crisis on Sub-Saharan Africa 17
grant
x and
s
t
i
s
i
r
s
S
1
Even recent signals are not reassuring: as Cindy Prieto points out,49
the Irish Government released an official statement on 3 February
2009, which reveals that Ireland will reduce its aid budget from
D 891 million to D 796 million,50 which was then followed by a fur-Figure 5 Share of emi
Source: ERD elaboration based upon data from the University of Susse
Aid budgets may be innocent mid term bystanders of the financial
crisis, and may be reduced to raise the resources that donor coun-
tries currently need to finance huge rescue interventions and their
fiscal stimulus packages in order to sustain internal demand. Robert
Zoellick, the president of the World Bank, has recently issued a
Call to Action, suggesting that “developed countries [should] pledge
an amount equivalent to 0.7% of their stimulus packages as addi-
tional aid, over and above existing ODA commitments”.46 Similarly,
the International Monetary Fund has recently argued that donor
countries should not renege on their prior commitments to scale
up aid to Africa, as honouring the Gleneagles commitments could
help sustain Sub-Saharan African growth and mitigate the impact
of the global financial crisis” (IMF, 2009a,b). Needless to say, the
resources that developed countries are currently devoting to sustain
their economies are such that they “made the efforts to enhance flows
of international development aid, which had peaked at around $120
billion in 2006, pale in comparison” (North-South Institute, 2009).
This entails that a reduction in the aid budget would have a limited to
non-existent effect on the financing needs of donor countries,47 but
46 See the document “World Bank Group Response to the Finan-
cial Crisis”, presented on March 24, 2009, and available at:
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/financialcrisis/pdf/WBGResponse-
VFF.pdf.
47 Robert Zoellick, quoted in Mold et al. (2009) recently affirmed that “at
$100 billion a year, the amount spent on overseas aid is a drop in the ocean
compared to the trillions of dollars that are now being spent on financial
rescues in the developed world”.
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the World Bank reported in Ratha and Shaw (2007).
uch an observation is not sufficient to dismiss the concerns about
he evolution of aid flows in 2009, and over the next few years since,
n the medium- to long-term, the large budget deficit due to fiscal
timulus in developed countries will have to be financed.
The experience with past crisis episodes – which were not global
n scope like the current one – reveals that donor countries tend to
educe their aid budgets significantly when facing a major reces-
ion. The figures provided by David Roodman show that Norway,
weden and Finland reduced their aid budgets in real terms by 10,
7 and 62% respectively after the Nordic banking crisis in 1991.4848 David Roodman, “History Says Financial Crisis Will Suppress
id”, 13 October 2008, Centre for Global Development, avail-
ble at: http://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2008/10/history-says-
nancial-crisis.php.
49 Cindy Prieto, “Ireland Becomes First Major European Donor to Cut
id”, 5 February 2009, Centre for Global Development, available at:
ttp://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2009/02/ireland-becomes-first-
ajor-eu.php.
50
“In this context, the Government has taken the difficult decision to reduce
he total budget provided for Ireland’s Overseas Development Assistance in
009 from D 891million to D 796 million. The size of our aid programme
s linked to our own economy, and specifically to GNP growth. Our inten-
ion is that, by taking action to curb public expenditure at this time, we
ill establish a platform for the resumption of strong economic growth,
1 F. Allen, G. Giovannetti
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Table 8 Determinants of aid effort in OECD DAC member
countries.
Aid to GDP ratio
Trade balance 0.619
[0.364]
Public debt −0.00138
[0.000360]***
Primary fiscal balance −0.0135
[0.00226]***
Government revenues 0.0133
[0.00286]***
Independent aid agency 0.0149
[0.0341]
Output gap −0.00124
[0.00380]
Output gap, cube 0.000264
[6.60e-05]***
Constant −0.116
[0.0911]
Observations 626
Number of country 22
Period 1970–2008
Country-fixed effects Yes
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her cut in April, the fourth in less than 10 months, which reduced
ommitments for 2009 by 22% with regard to what was initially
lanned. By the same token, analysis of the Italian budget reveals
hat Italy could halve its aid budget in 2009, thus hitting a historical
ow, with aid falling close to – if not, even below – 0.10% of gross
omestic product.51 As the concerns about the future evolution of
id flows could be solid-grounded, we provide an assessment of the
xposure of fragile African countries to the effect of the possible
uts in aid budgets on the part of donor countries.
Extending the work of Bertoli et al. (2007), who analyse the
eterminants of the aid allocations by the member countries of the
ECD Development Assistance Committee over the 1970–2004
eriod, we predict the level of aid budget in 2009 for each of the 22
ember countries; then, we will move from the part of the donors’ to
hat of the recipients, assuming that each donor allocates its budget
cross recipient countries keeping the allocations that had prevailed
ver the 2003–2007 period unchanged.52 This suggests a picture
f the magnitude of such an effect, and of its repercussions across
frican countries.
Surprisingly enough, in the otherwise extensive literature on offi-
ial development assistance, little attention has been paid to the
actors that influence donor choice to allocate fiscal resources to
id.53 The few exceptions are represented by Round and Odedokun
2004), Faini (2006), Bertoli et al. (2007), and Chong and Gradstein
2008). These papers consider a set of structural, economic, polit-
cal and institutional variables as possible determinants of the aid
o GDP ratio for each OECD DAC member country, and the lim-
ted number of existing analyses entail that a shared consensus on
he determinants of aid allocations has not yet been reached, and
he relationship between the evolution of fiscal budget and the aid
llocations makes no exception. While Faini (2006) concludes that
lower budget deficit is associated with a higher aid to GDP ratio,
oth Round and Odedokun (2004) and Bertoli et al. (2007) draw
he opposite conclusion, suggesting that the fiscal deficit is per se
poor measure of the fiscal stance of a government. However, this
s not sufficient to conclude, as Mold et al. (2009) do, that “the
xisting evidence lends support to a rather agnostic interpretation of
rends for aid budgets during the course of the current crisis”, as the
udget deficit represents just one of the channels through which the
risis might affect donors’ aid efforts. Existing studies consistently
nd that aid allocations increase with a stronger rate of growth of
DP,54 and with a higher level of fiscal revenues, and this suggests
nd further significant expansion of the Government’s development pro-
ramme in years to come”; from the Statement on ODA levels by the
inister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Micheál Martin, T.D., and the Minister
f State for Overseas Development, Mr Peter Power, T.D. available at:
ttp://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=81054.
51 Action aid Europe, “False sheen on European Aid Money”,
tatement released on March 30, 2009, and available at:
ttp://www.actionaid.org/eu/index.aspx?PageID=4485.
52 OECD DAC data on total aid budgets are available – on a prelimary basis
also for 2008, but bilateral allocations are not, and this is why we will look
t allocations across recipient countries over the 2003–2007 period.
53 Alesina and Dollar (2002) and Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) analyse
ow OECD DAC countries allocate across recipient countries a given aid
udget, while here we are interested in analysing how such a budget is
etermined, while Biggeri and Sanfilippo (2009) perform a similar analysis
or a non-DAC donor, namely, China.
54 Bertoli et al. (2007) find that the aid to GDP ratio moves procyclically, but
he existence of an independent development agency smoothes the pattern
f aid allocations along the business cycle, as it represents an internal lobby
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R2 0.358
Note: robust standard errors in brackets; ***p < 0.01.
hat the impact of the crisis on aid flows might be severe, because –
s Mold et al. (2009) themselves suggest – we are currently moving
n “unchartered waters”.
.8. Predicting aid budgets for 2009
e extend to 2008 the dataset of Bertoli et al. (2007), and we model
he aid to GDP ratio on an unbalanced panel of observations for the
2 OECD DAC member countries over the 1970–2008 period. The
efinition of aid that we adopt is total disbursements, thus including
oth debt cancellations and emergency aid.55
The set of determinants on which the evolution of the aid to GDP
atio is modelled includes the trade balance, the public debt, the
rimary fiscal deficit, government revenues, the output gap – with
ll these variables taken as ratios to the GDP – and the existence of
n autonomous aid agency.56 The estimation strategy allows for both
ountry- and year-specific fixed effects. The measure of the output
ap – which captures the phase of the business cycle as it reflects the
ifference from the potential level of the GDP and its actual level –
s included also in a higher-order term, to capture possible relevant
on-linearities in the relationship between the business cycle and
he aid budget. Specifically, this allows us to test whether major
lowdowns and recessions lead to a more than proportional reduction
n the size of the budget item that is allocated to development aid.
Table 8 reports the outcome of the panel estimation that repre-
ents the basis for the prediction of aid budget in 2009. The estimated
hich is better able to defend its budget share against competing claims.
55 This choice is constrained by the fact that this is the only measure of aid
hat – albeit on a provisional basis – the OECD DAC has already released
or 2008.
56 The sources of the data are represented by the OECD QWIDS and Eco-
omic Outlook databases, while the institutional variable on the existence
f an independent development agency was originally collected by Bertoli
t al. (2007).
The effects of the financial crisis on Sub-Saharan Africa
Table 9 Actual aid budgets in 2008 and predicted aid budgets for
2009, $ million.
Donor country 2008 2009 Variation
Australia 3166 2680 −486
Austria 1681 1477 −204
Belgium 2381 2123 −258
Canada 4725 3672 −1053
Denmark 2800 2711 −89
Finland 1139 1027 −112
France 10,957 9460 −1497
Germany 13,910 11,757 −2153
Greece 693 536 −157
Ireland 1325 860 −465
Italy 4444 2936 −1508
Japan 9362 6893 −2469
Luxembourg 409 375 −34
Netherlands 6993 6598 −395
New Zealand 346 309 −37
Norway 3967 3502 −465
Portugal 614 533 −81
Spain 6686 5676 −1010
Sweden 4730 4561 −169
Switzerland 2016 1804 −212
United Kingdom 11,409 10,438 −971
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Short-term portfolio flows were too limited to affect the SSA
economy seriously. According to recent estimates, short-term net
private capital flows to emerging countries accounted for USD 253
billion in 2007 and declined to USD 141 billion in 2008.59 Inflows
57 Bond issue stood at only USD 6 billion with respect to USD 33 billion
for Asia and USD 19 billion for Latin America; Africa received only USD
3 billion of private resources in 2007, compared to USD 42 billion for Asia,
AfDB 2009a.
58 Banking assets are 0.87% of global banking assets, according to AfDB
2009d.
59 According to Macias and Massa (2009), in 2006 portfolio equity flowsUnited States 26,008 17,615 −8393
DAC total 119,761 97,544 −22,217
Source: ERD elaborations on OECD DAC.
co-efficients are in line with those obtained in Bertoli et al. (2007),
with just one single, but relevant, departure: while the co-efficient of
the output gap is statistically insignificant, the cube of this variable
is highly significant statistically, suggesting that major fluctuations
in the business cycle – like the 2008–2009 one – can have a more
than proportional impact on budget allocations to development aid.
The estimates reported in Table 8 allow us to predict the level of
the resources that each donor country could devote to aid in 2009.
Clearly, such a prediction is exposed to two sources of uncertainty:
the first relating to the estimation of the co-efficients of the relevant
variables, and the second relating to the forecasts of the variables
themselves, which are drawn from the OECD Economic Outlook.
This entails that these predictions need not to be taken at face value,
although they can reveal the size of the possible effects of the cri-
sis on aid flows. Table 9 reports the size of the aid budget for each
OECD DAC member country in 2008, and the levels that we predict
for 2009.
Table 9 suggests that total aid flows from OECD DAC countries
could fall by $22 billion in 2009, and the fall is unevenly distributed
– both in absolute and in relative terms – across donor countries.
Such a predicted impact of the current financial and economic crisis
on total aid budgets casts doubts on the possibility of the member
countries living up to their commitments to scale up aid flows to
Africa.
4.9. The impact on Sub-Saharan African countries
To see now how different recipients are affected, we assume that
OECD DAC countries allocate the same predicted budget for 2009
across countries as they did on average over the period 2003–2007.
The picture that we get is not optimistic, as the predicted reductions
in aid flows for African countries between 2008 and 2009 range
between 12% and 36%. As Fig. 6 shows, most Sub-Saharan African
countries can be expected to be exposed to a reduction in aid flows
t
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f between 15% and 20%, which – especially in more aid-dependent
ountries – could represent a severe macro-economic shock.
While Fig. 6 does not evidence a differential exposure to the
ffects of the predicted fall in aid flows, what needs to be stressed
s that these countries are less able to cope with a reduction in what
epresents – for most of them – the single most relevant revenue
tem in their Balance of Payments. Fragile African countries might
uffer severe social costs from such a sharp reduction in aid flows,
hich could be avoided – or, at least, softened – by an improvement
f the focus of aid flows on the countries that pose the more severe
evelopment challenges.
Needless to say, European donors should avoid reducing aid to
ub-Saharan African countries in general, and to fragile countries in
articular, as the aid channel would then add to the adverse effects
hat go through the channels previously described. However, the
ear that donor countries, which have incurred high domestic costs
n order to cope with the present economic crisis, may reduce their
ows cannot be easily dismissed, given both the historical experi-
nce and some worrying early signals. According to the IMF, despite
he international commitments to scale up aid, projections do not
uggest such scaling-up to be in the pipeline for 2009 and suggests
hat low income countries could suffer from a 25% reduction with
espect to the previous year.
. Direct impact of the financial crisis on Sub-Saharan Africa
e mentioned before that most fragile Sub-Saharan African coun-
ries have under-developed financial systems and that this has
omehow protected them from a direct transmission of the crisis.
Africa’s external financing (bonds issues, stocks and private bor-
owing) is low,57 representing only 4% in 2007 of overall issue for
merging economies” (Kasekende et al., 2009, p. 1). Since the finan-
ial channels include effects through the stock markets (stock market
apitalisation of Africa is only 2.09% of world capitalisation) and the
anking sector,58 i.e., mainly borrowing from advanced economies
nd private investment funds, African countries, where the (small)
anking system plays, in any case, a bigger role than financial mar-
ets, were at the “borders of the crisis”. Furthermore, the banking
ystem has suffered mainly in those countries where there is a pres-
nce of foreign banks (Mozambique, Swaziland and Madagascar).
any countries, especially oil exporters, had accumulated foreign
xchange reserves in the years of the raw material price boom, and
his has supported the birth (expansion) of Sovereign Funds (for
nstance, in Nigeria or the Sudan). It is not clear (due to the lack of
ecent data) how SWF will evolve.o SSA doubled “reaching a value of $15 billion. Most of these flows went
o South Africa (88%), but other countries with established and relatively
ore developed stock markets, like Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire/the Ivory Coast,
hana, Mauritius and Kenya, also experienced increases in portfolio flows”.
. 3.
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nto fragile African countries are, however, negligible, and this chan-
el could impact on fragile countries mainly though its indirect
ffect, via intra-Africa migration and trade flows (namely, though
he influence of South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria on fragile African
ountries). A higher risk aversion together with the global credit-
ightening, as well as the increased volatility of capital markets and
xchange rates, has, however, involved a decrease of the (already
ow) inflows in SSA. This decline (or reversal of trend) in portfolio
ows could affect government borrowing and increase debt burdens
nd create some debt-servicing difficulties in some countries. “In
igeria, foreign portfolio investors withdrew $15 billion from the
apital market in January 2009” (p. 3, ODI, 2009), the stock mar-
et capitalisation fell by almost half, and the “All Share Index lost
total share of 67% from March 2008 to March 2009” (ibidem).
ut also in other SSA countries, such as Kenya, Uganda, Benin,
hana or Zambia, the stock markets lost more than 20% in the last
ear. Some of these emerging African markets (South Africa, Kenya,
hana and Nigeria), in which financial markets are more integrated,
uffered a direct effect and spread the negative spill-overs also onto
eighbouring countries. Furthermore, “many bond issuance plans
ere put on hold. Ghana has cancelled a plan for $300 million
ebt. Kenya has delayed a planned debut $500 million Eurobond.
anzania has postponed plans to issue a debut Eurobond totalling ateast $500 million until market conditions improve. Uganda will not
ssue a debut Eurobond to fund infrastructure projects”. (see Macias
nd Massa, 2009, p. 5). Furthermore, according to the IMF (2008),
here were no SSA foreign currency denominated bond issues in
008 (Tables 10–13).
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rAid flows to Africa in 2009.
One financial channel of transmission which is relevant in SSA
s the increase in the costs of external debt. This started to rise in July
007, even though the spreads remained moderate until the begin-
ing of the financial crisis. According to the African Development
ank (2009a,b,c), the spreads for African countries in October 2008
ose by 250 basis points (on average). Furthermore, Kenya, Uganda
nd Tanzania were forced “to postpone tapping of international
nancial markets to mobilise long-term resources, turning instead to
ocal markets” (Kasekende et al., 2009, p. 5). Finally, we mentioned
bove that the financial crisis amplified the increase in the margin
pplied to loans in the international financial markets, especially for
merging and African countries. In most countries, the impact of
he financial crisis manifested itself through currency fluctuations,
specially against the US dollar or the Euro. The depreciation of
ome currencies is attributable to the impact of the financial crisis
n commodity prices and the decline in foreign exchange reserves.
. Can fragile states cope with the crisis?
aving described some “facts” related to the financial crisis and
ighlighted the main transmission channels to SSA and fragile coun-
ries in particular, we can assess the capacity of fragile countries to
ope with the crisis. This could suggest some guidelines for interven-
ion for the EU. We mentioned above that countries are vulnerable
conomically when they are particularly sensitive to external shocks.
e first evaluate the exposure to shocks, and then the capacity to
eact. We want to check whether fragile countries – in line with
The effects of the financial crisis on Sub-Saharan Africa 21
Table 10 Stock market losses for some countries.
Region/Country Index name Index code % Change
in July
% Change in
August
% Change in
September
% Change in
third quarter
Côte d’Ivoire/Ivory Coast BRVM Composite Index BRVM CI −4.0 5.6 0.5 1.9
Egypt CASE 30 Index CASE30 8.3 8.6 1.3 19.1
Kenya Kenya Stock Index KSE −0.7 −5.5 −1.8 −7.8
Mauritius Mauritius AllShares SEMDEX 4.6 0.8 10.7 16.7
Morocco Casa All Share Index MASI −5.3 1.1 −2.5 −6.7
Nigeria NSE All Share Index NSE −5.9 −7.7 −3.6 −16.2
South Africa All Share Index JALSH 10.0 4.1 −2.9 11.2
Tunisia Tunis se Tnse Index STK TUNINDEX −1.5 3.5 9.1 11.2
USA Dow Jones Industrial DJ Index 8.6 4.1 −0.6 12.3
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Source: African Development Bank (2009a,b,c).
expectations – are more vulnerable to shocks than other Sub-Saharan
countries. Like Naudé (2009), we consider diversification, external
indebtedness, the openness of the economy, cross-border liabili-
ties, capital to risk-weighted assets, and rate of credit growth in the
private sector.60 More precisely, for each fragile country with data
(hence, excluding Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe), we
analyse:
• Openness, measured as the share of exports over GDP;
• Concentration of exports, measured as the Herfindahl–Hirschman
Index – the more diversified the basket of exports, the less vul-
nerable the country;
• External indebtedness, measured as external debt as a share of
GDP;
• Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets;
• Cross-border liabilities;
• Growth of credit to the private sector.
We compute the ranking for countries as a simple average to
avoid distortions. We rank all Sub-Saharan countries – fragile and
non-fragile – according to a criterion in which a low rank means
low vulnerability and a high rank means high vulnerability. We then
divide the countries into roughly three equal groups from low to
high. Countries in situations of fragility, according to our operational
definition, are spread equally among the three groups.61Fragile countries will suffer from the steep fall in international
trade. However, they will also suffer from deteriorating terms of
trade and shrinking remittances because of higher unemployment
in developed countries and in emerging Sub-Saharan African coun-
60 Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney (2009) refer to structural vul-
nerability using an economic vulnerability index that combines the exposure
to shocks – population size, distance from world market, concentration of
goods exports, and relative share of value added in agriculture, forestry,
and fishing – and the “size” of the shock itself. African Development Bank
(2009a,b,c) uses structural macro-economic factors such as falling reserves,
high concentration of foreign ownership in the banking system, inflationary
expectations, and reductions in GDP growth, the terms of trade and the cur-
rent account. The European Commission DG Development uses three sets of
variables: dependence on export revenues; dependence on external financial
flows and capacity to react.
61 Also the ranks by the African Development Bank and the European
Commission DG Development give similar results. Fragile countries are
spread across the different groups even though the variables considered to
rank countries according to their vulnerability are somehow different.
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29.1 7.8 −1.2 16.2
4.0 1.7 −7.6 −2.3
ries, declining FDI and disinvestments and possibly a reduction
n aid flows, at least in the short- to medium-run. To understand
ow they can cope with the recession or other negative shocks, we
ropose and apply an overall resilience index.
Resilience is a multi-faceted characteristic of a socio-economic
ystem, which is only partly understood, and whose measurement
s controversial. Following Naudé (2009), we focus here just on
ts macro-economic dimensions, which relate to the ability of the
tate to implement adequate policies in reaction to a shock, such
s the 2008–09 crisis. Hence, additional dimensions of resilience
at household or community level – are not considered; although
heir relevance should not be downplayed, it is still state institutions
hich represent a pillar of resilience. With this caveat in mind, we
uild an index of the resilience of each Sub-Saharan African country,
y examining four separate dimensions:62
Macro-economic management, reflected in balance of payments
and fiscal balances and levels of currency reserves;
Good governance;
Market efficiency, measured by the Doing Business in 2009 indi-
cators;
Social cohesion, measured by using the ethnolinguistic fraction-
alisation index and the political instability index.
We then aggregate these four components of the resilience index,
nd we rank Sub-Saharan African countries according to their capac-
ty to cope with external shocks, in three main categories: low,
edium and high resilience. The sub-group of fragile countries is
ainly classified as low resilience.
We note that the most fragile countries are in the group of low
esilience countries. In each country, it is likely that those most
ffected will be the poorest, those less resilient than average (at
ommunity and household level).
The ability of fragile countries to react to the crisis was impaired
ot only by fragility itself, but also by the previous food and fuel
rises: food- and oil-importing fragile countries suffered from the
ransmission of the real effects of the 2008–09 crisis when most
f them were already in a highly stressed situation, which further
dded to their limited ability to react to the crisis due to the fragility
f their state institutions.
62 See the background paper by Naudé (2009) see also Fosu and Naudé,
009 with additional details on the index.
22 F. Allen, G. Giovannetti
Table 11 Overall vulnerability rank.
Country Rankings
Naudé (2009) AfDB European Commission DG Development
Angola High High Low
Benin Low Moderate Medium
Botswana Medium Very Low Low
Burkina Faso Medium Moderate Medium
Burundi High Very high Medium
Cameroon Medium Low Low
Cape Verde High Moderate Medium
Central African Republic Low High High
Chad Medium Moderate Low
Comoros Low n.c. Medium
Congo, Dem. Rep. of High High High
Congo, Rep. of Low n.c. Low
Côte d’Ivoire/Ivory Coast, The High High Medium
Equatorial Guinea Low Low Low
Eritrea Low Very high Medium
Ethiopia Low Moderate Medium
Gabon High Very Low Low
Gambia, The Low High High
Ghana High Moderate High
Guinea Medium n.c. Medium
Guinea-Bissau Medium Moderate Medium
Kenya Medium High Medium
Lesotho Medium High Medium
Liberia High High High
Madagascar Low Very high Medium
Malawi Low High Medium
Mali High n.c. Medium
Mauritius High Moderate Medium
Mozambique High n.c. High
Namibia Medium Very Low Medium
Niger Low Very high Medium
Nigeria High High Low
Rwanda Low High Medium
São Tomé and Príncipe Medium High High
Senegal Medium Very high Medium
Seychelles High Moderate High
Sierra Leone Low High Medium
South Africa High n.c. n.c.
Swaziland Medium Low Low
Tanzania Medium Moderate High
Togo Medium Very high Medium
Uganda Low Low Medium
Zambia Medium High High
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Notes: countries belonging to the operational definition of fragile countri
synthetic measure the external and fiscal position of a country, and the de
If we consider the vulnerability and low resilience jointly, we
ee that many fragile countries have high vulnerability and have
ow resilience: these are the countries most exposed to the effects
f the crisis.
. A summary of the main effects of the crisis for countries in
ituation of fragilitye have analysed the channels of transmission of the 2008–2009
risis to Sub-Saharan Africa, with an eye on countries in situations
f fragility which have weak governance institutions, which, in turn,
ndermine their ability to provide public services to the community.
any of these countries are still in a situation of armed conflict, or
f
a
l
aommunication.
in bold; n.c. denotes not classified; vulnerability indexes combine into a
f diversification of its export basket.
ave recently emerged from conflicts. Most of them are net food
mporters and have had to cope with increasing food prices, which
re still higher than before the recent food crisis, while some are oil
raw materials) importers and have had to cope with high and highly
olatile prices (which, in turn, increases uncertainty and discour-
ges trade and investments). Most of them depend on the exports of
small basket of products, directed to a small set of markets. They
eavily depend on remittances and aid flows, and on scant domestic
esources, which depend largely on taxes on exports (which there-
ore fall with declining exports). Foreign direct investment inflows
re concentrated in a few sectors (mining, oil, and, more recently,
and). Financial markets are at best in an infant state. Safety-nets
re limited, when they exist.
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Table 12 Overall resilience rank – from low to high.
Low Medium High
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 1 Ethiopia 16 Burkina Faso 31
Chad 3 Sierra Leone 17 Togo 32
Burundi 4 Zambia 18 Madagascar 33
Central African Republic 5 Malawi 19 Benin 34
Eritrea 6 São Tomé and Príncipe 20 Tanzania 35
Congo, Rep. of 7 Cameroon 21 Mozambique 36
Guinea-Bissau 8 Mali 22 Lesotho 37
Côte d’Ivoire 9 Uganda 23 Swaziland 38
Guinea 10 Nigeria 24 Seychelles, The 39
Niger 11 Ghana 25 Gabon 40
Kenya 12 Senegal 26 Namibia 41
Liberia 13 Cape Verde 27 South Africa 42
Angola 14 Rwanda 28 Mauritius 43
Comoros 15 Equatorial Guinea 29 Botswana 44
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The fragility of state institutions blunts political processes for
state capacity and citizen expectations to reach an equilibrium.
The global financial and economic crisis further jeopardises the
chances that such an equilibrium will be maintained in fragile Sub-
63 These estimates are from ODI (2009) and rely on country case Studies.Gambia, The
Source: Naudé (2009).
Note: countries belonging to the operational definition of fragile countries
On the one hand, there are some specific features of African
countries in situations of fragility, which distinguish them from other
developing countries, and, on the other hand, countries in situations
of fragility, even before the financial crisis started, were in precarious
conditions and had very little space for manoeuvre.
What characterises SSA (and is likely to characterise fragile
countries) is a persistence of the effects of shocks, potentially very
damaging, especially in countries in which the capacity to cope with
the shocks is very low. Exports seem to take longer to recover than
in other developing countries, and not because of their composi-
tion, skewed towards raw materials (see Berman and Martin, 2009),
uncertainty impacts strongly – and asymmetrically – on foreign
direct investments; the withdrawal or postponement of infrastruc-
tural projects has very long-term consequences, especially in terms
of lower competitiveness of exports; the fall of remittances can
also have long-term consequences, because, in many cases, income
from remittances is used differently from domestic income sources:
remittances are often invested in education and housing (Maimbo
and Ratha, 2005). Acquisition of farmland in Africa could improve
agricultural productivity, but there are many risks that all the bene-
fits will be taken by the “new owners”, in a situation in which recent
forecasts mention that food imports in Africa will increase substan-
tially and that food security will be a major issue in the years to
come.
A number of estimates of the effect of the crisis on SSA (less on
fragile countries in Africa) exist, emphasise a general slow down
in growth, affecting most countries (see IMF, 2009a,b; African
Development Bank, 2009a,b,c; World Bank, 2009a,b,c,d,e; African
Development Bank, 2010a), and point to negative spill-over effects.
The GDP growth in 2010, (AfDB 2010b) however, is recovering to
rates on average around 4.5%, still below the 6% annual average of
pre-crisis years. Though it is often true that growth does not translate
into improvements in development indicators (and/or in well-being),
a reduction in growth is very likely to have damaging effects on
many of the MDGs (and other development targets). Asymmetries
are, indeed, very common: growth may not translate into better edu-
cation or health, but recession undoubtedly implies fewer resources
for health and education (as well as other development indicators).
Considering FDI, aid, remittances and portfolio outflows
together, the amount of financial resources at risk in Africa for 2009
could be around 12–15% of African GDP (African Development
S
p
m30
bold.
ank, 2009a,b,c). A fall of 30–40% in these inflows could mean
n annual decline in financial resources of around USD 50–60 bil-
ion, which, according to the ODI (2009), means “50 million people
rapped in absolute poverty, with the number expected to rise to
0 million” (p. 1). Recent estimates suggest that, as far as poverty
s concerned, there could be around 230,000 new poor in 2009 in
ganda (0.8% of population) and in Ghana (1%), 38,800 for Zam-
ia, 57,700 for Kenya, and 52,000 for Benin.63 Clearly, all other
DGs could be at risk: increase in infant mortality (400,000 addi-
ional deaths, according to the African Development Bank, 2009a,b;
riedman and Schady, 2009), and education attainments are further
xamples. This could prove particularly damaging in the longer-
un, since only by investing in human capital could fragile countries
e fit to recover from the crisis and provide themselves with
pportunities.
Another variable of concern is unemployment. This is particu-
arly relevant, since there seems to be a positive relationship between
oung male unemployment and illegal activities (drug traffic, ter-
orism, etc.).64 According to recent estimates, unemployment could
ncrease by 8.5% in 2009. The ILO (2009) maintains that there could
e 3 million newly unemployed while there could be up to 28 million
dditional vulnerable jobs because of the crisis.65 The ODI (2009)
oncentrates on few SSA countries and assesses some numbers for
he newly-unemployed: 8100 workers in Zambia in the mining sec-
or, 5000 in Ghana in foreign-owned firms, 1200 in Kenya in the
orticultural industry. According to the Minister of Mining of the
RC (quoted from Kasekende et al., 2009) closures of mines have
caused a loss of up to 200,000 jobs” (p. 15), “a local textile com-
any in the West (of Madagascar) closed, causing the job of 4000
obs” (p. 16).ee also Chen and Ravallion (2009) for recent estimates on the effect on
overty.
64 See Collier, 2009.
65 Anonopoulos (2009) argues that job losses in developing countries are
ost likely to hit “female intensive” activities.
24 F. Allen, G. Giovannetti
Table 13 Financial inflows to SSA as percentage of GDP in 2007.
Country ODA net inflows, all donors FDI inflows Workers remittances Exports
Angola 0.41% −2.53% n.a. 71.30%
Benin 8.47% 0.86% 3.12% 11.80%
Botswana 0.85% 4.01% 0.95% 47.40%
Burkina Faso 13.74% 8.86% 0.74% 10.50%
Burundi 48.07% 0.01% 0.01% 8.30%
Cameroon 9.34% 1.37% 0.50% 24.20%
Cape Verde 11.19% 12.14% 9.79% 43.10%
Central African Republic 10.38% 1.60% n.a. 14.80%
Chad 5.01% 8.59% n.a. 11.80%
Comoros 9.46% 0.17% 2.55% 14.80%
Congo 1.66% 4.59% 0.15% 80.30%
Congo Dem. Rep. 12.20% 7.22% n.a. 46.00%
Côte d’Ivoire/Ivory Coast, The 0.83% 2.15% 0.91% 46.60%
Equatorial Guinea 0.25% 13.72% n.a. 81.90%
Eritrea 11.73% −0.21% n.a. 6.80%
Ethiopia 12.47% 1.31% 0.89% 12.80%
Gabon 0.42% 2.33% 0.06% 64.70%
Gambia, The 11.13% 9.79% 9.80% 36.00%
Ghana 7.66% 5.69% 0.70% 39.80%
Guinea 5.39% 2.67% 1.00% 29.10%
Guinea-Bissau 32.43% 1.84% 7.63% 23.50%
Kenya 4.72% 2.69% 4.81% 25.40%
Lesotho 7.76% 6.33% 22.22% 55.00%
Liberia 95.37% 5.75% 93.86% 38.30%
Madagascar 12.14% 13.56% 0.15% 28.60%
Malawi 20.47% 1.52% 0.03% 23.70%
Mali 14.21% 5.03% 2.96% 28.20%
Mauritania 12.90% 5.42% 0.07%
Mauritius 1.08% 4.89% 3.10% 60.80%
Mozambique 22.02% 5.30% 0.99% 37.60%
Namibia 2.35% 8.01% 0.19% 49.00%
Niger 12.74% 0.64% 1.56% 19.90%
Nigeria 1.22% 7.44% 1.99% 40.30%
Rwanda 20.90% 1.97% 1.50% 10.00%
São Tomé and Principe 25.70% 25.22% 1.43% 7.60%
Senegal 7.46% 0.69% 7.73% 23.50%
Seychelles 0.31% 27.23% 539.56% 123.80%
Sierra Leone 32.06% 4.85% 2.28% 20.90%
Somalia
South Africa 0.28% 2.01% 0.15% 31.60%
Sudan, The 4.52% 5.24% 2.49%
Swaziland 2.17% 1.30% 3.41% 76.90%
Tanzania 16.84% 3.59% 0.09% 21.20%
Togo 4.84% 2.76% 7.70% 42.00%
Uganda 14.51% 3.09% 7.13% 17.00%
Zambia 9.16% 8.62% 0.52% 42.70%
Zimbabwe 3.88% 0.58% n.a. 17.10%
Africa 2.97% 4.07% 2.48%
SSA (incl. Sudan) 4.19% 3.86% 1.89% 38.20%
are i
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Miguel et al. (2004) analysed the determinants of civil war in 41
African countries, showing that a 5% reduction in the rate of eco-Source: ERD elaboration on OECD, African Economic Outlook 2009.
Note: countries belonging to the operational definition of fragile countries
aharan African countries. Armed conflict is a possible outcome
f the divergence between state capacity and citizens’ expecta-
ions. This concern was voiced by Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the
anaging Director of the IMF, who argued that, for low-income
ountries:“we don’t just care about growth for growth’s sake, we also
want to safeguard peace and prevent war. Indeed, when low-
income countries were doing well over the past decade or so, the
n
Cn bold.
incidence of war declined significantly. The great fear is that this
trend could be reversed.”66omic growth increases the risk of a conflict by a half. Brückner and
iccone (2007) find that a crash in the price of an export commodity
66 Strauss-Kahn (2009).
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increases the likelihood of an armed conflict. And Ciccone (2008)
shows that a drought-induced fall in incomes produces a similar
effect.
Such a tragic outcome of the crisis in Sub-Saharan African fragile
countries increases the human and social costs of the global financial
and economic crisis. While Sub-Saharan African countries need not
suffer more from a higher macro-economic shock than other coun-
tries in the region, the consequences could be much more severe, due
to their limited capacity to implement adequate policy responses to
the shocks. This is why protecting fragile countries from the fallout
of the crisis should rank high among the donor priorities.
8. Possible responses to the crisis
There is a need for a country-by-country assessment. The variety
of indirect channels through which fragile countries were affected
suggests that it is necessary to move towards a tailored approach, in
which we analyse the exposure of each single country to the effects
of the crisis. Recent research67 has shown that even some of the most
successful among the SSA countries faced a slowdown but also a
fairly rapid recovery. The magnitude of the slowdown depended
upon a combination of factors, including the terms of trade shock,
the degree of the economies’ dependence upon external financial
flows, the performance of macro-economic indicators,68 and the
degree of inter-relation of the financial system with the international
markets. Another relevant issue has to do with the chance to adjust
the exchange rate downwards and the consequences for the Bal-
ance of Payments. The strength of the recovery depends on country
specific characteristics, as well as on the uncertainty around world
trade development. On the positive side, the 2008–2009 crisis could
have created an opportunity for (at least some) Sub Saharan African
countries to diversify their trade (both in terms of good composition
and destination markets) and investment.69
For all countries, it is necessary, in the long-run, to build
greater resilience to shocks. This requires the diversification of their
economies, and, in particular, for those countries that have heavy
reliance on one or two primary commodities to develop other sources
of income. Diversification of exports is an important part of this.
Stabilisation funds may also have a role to play. There is a signif-
icant need for countries to reduce their aid dependency since this
makes them much less vulnerable to reductions when a crisis occurs.
Stability will be enhanced by the development of pro-cyclical fis-
cal systems. Countries can use foreign exchange reserves to allow
external shocks to be smoothed so that the countries can self-insure.
For countries that are heavily reliant on only a few commodities,
the use of long-term contracts with fixed prices may be helpful,
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